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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fairness and e ciency are two classical and connected topics in economics. They have be-
come well known, perhaps due to Adam Smith’s two influential works: The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759), which highlights a concern for fairness concern as part of morality, and
The Wealth of Nations (1776), which underlines a concern for e ciency. However, during the
rapid development of economics, fairness has received disproportionately less attention than
e ciency. As a result, many people, including some economists, have incorrectly understood
that economics as a subject no longer cares about fairness.
The primary objective of this thesis is to dispel this misperception. We would argue
here that, similar to e ciency, fairness is an important factor for both social and individual
decisions, and sometimes its e↵ect can be determined.
Written in a three-paper format, this thesis explores fairness from three di↵erent an-
gles. These angles cover the broad areas of how theoretical economists model fairness in
social choice theory1, how the general public perceive distributive fairness, and how peo-
ple implement their fairness norms in making real-life donations. This multidimensional
exploration is believed to be crucial to a comprehensive understanding of fairness.
1Social choice theory deals with the aggregation of some measure of individual welfare into a collective
measure (Sen, 2008).
1
Chapter 3 presents the first paper, which makes a theoretical contribution to social
choice theory. We reconsider John Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955, 1977b) utilitarian impartial ob-
server theorem. In this theorem, Harsanyi argues that an impartial social decision can only
be made by “the impartial observer” (who is behind a veil of ignorance and unknown about
her identity in society) and this impartial observer follows a utilitarian principle (which
credits the best policy as one that maximises the average expected utility). Departing from
Harsanyi’s individual-centred approach, we argue that, when societal decisions are at stake,
postulates must not be drawn from individualistic behaviour. Rather, they should be based
on societal norms. Hence, notions like societal fairness (Diamond, 1967; Sen 1977) should
explicitly be the guiding principles. Continuing this line of thinking, we state and prove a
utilitarian result that, rather than being based on the independence assumption, is based
on the notion of procedural fairness and on symmetric treatment of societal and individual
lotteries.
Chapter 4 presents the second paper, which contributes to an understanding of public
perceptions of distributive fairness. The last few decades have witnessed an increasing pro-
portion of all cancers are lifestyle-induced, a trend tends to continue. To assess policies used
to address this challenge and to construct a more equitable healthcare system, it is important
to gain a better understanding of how individual responsibility is viewed by individual soci-
ety members. We have constructed a procedure to assess these preferences with respect to
lifestyle-induced and hereditary cancers by eliciting donations to these two types of cancers.
Lifestyle-induced cancers involve greater individual responsibility than hereditary cancers, as
individuals can control more elements of lifestyle than heredity. The results of implementing
our procedure via an online survey demonstrate that subjects take individual responsibility
into account by donating about twice as much to cancers with less individual responsibility.
Their choices are also a↵ected by group identity, perceptions of cancer likelihood and social
demographics.
2
Chapter 5 presents the third paper, which makes an empirical contributions to un-
derstanding how people imply fairness principles in everyday donations. The paper uses
information on charitable contributions to cancer research in the United Kingdom to elicit
information on fairness principles endorsed by donors. The latter face a choice between con-
tributing to several hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers and their choices of how much
to donate to di↵erent cancers reveal how they view luck vis-a-vis individual choices. We
find that provision of information on lifestyle-related causes of cancer adversely a↵ects con-
tributions. In contrast, information on hereditary causes has a positive e↵ect on donations.
Thus, a non-negligible share of the donors lean toward choice egalitarianism, which condi-
tions outcomes on the potential beneficiaries’ choices, and this is mainly due to preferences
of women who tend to strongly favor choice egalitarianism.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature
review. The final chapter of the thesis summarises the findings and draws conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Background – Welfare Economics
Policy-choice problems occur frequently in almost every aspect of social life, including the
distribution of resources and the construction of legal systems. Since each policy choice has
its own specificities, it is rarely easy to select the optimum policy from various alternatives.
In order to contribute to these policy-choice questions, economists and other social scientists
have invested considerable e↵ort in constructing procedures for assessing policies. One sub-
branch – social choice theory1 – has also been developed to allow for methodical discussion, in
which a consequentialism view is adopted such that the criterion used for policy assessment
is its e↵ect on the wellbeing of social members.
Since this thesis is built also within the framework of welfare economics, it will be
useful to clarify several key assumptions. The illustration of how these assumptions are
1One great thinker that must be mentioned is Kenneth Arrow. His notable contribution, known as Arrow’s
impossibility theory (1951), is perhaps the most influential one in social choice theory. We deliberately did
not choose to review the literature based on Arrow’s theorem because another fundamental theory, namely
Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955, 1977b) utilitarian impartial observer theorem, is more relevant to our research
interest. Di↵erent to Arrow’s framework, utility in Harsanyi’s framework is assumed to be both cardinal and
interpersonal comparable. These two assumptions will be explained in this section shortly, and they are also
the reason that Harsanyi’s theorem can escape the impossibility theory (Harsanyi 1979, p.303).
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generated is by examining two essential steps in developing an appropriate procedure for
policy assessment. The first step is to transfer the e↵ect of the policy into a standardised
measurement, since the relative e↵ect of di↵erent policies cannot be evaluated without a
comparable measurement. For example, if a society is facing a choice of whether or not to
introduce a more aggressive tax policy so that more money can be allocated to public health,
then, for each social member involved, the pain of paying more tax and the enjoyment of
having more secure healthcare are measured on di↵erent dimensions and are thus incompa-
rable. In order to allow for comparison, economists often use the term “utility” as a proxy
for this standardised measurement. In welfare economics, the term utility refers specifically
to policy e↵ects on the wellbeing of individuals. A positive change in utility is allocated
to each social member if a policy increases his or her wellbeing, while a negative change in
utility is allocated if a policy harms his or her wellbeing. Policy assessments are then based
solely on these standardised wellbeing measures, namely utilities.
The second, more challenging step is to aggregate information on all social members’
wellbeing so that an overall judgement about the social desirability of a policy can be formed.
Several normative ways have been suggested, which will be examined in detail shortly. How-
ever, another key assumption should be clarified here, which is that “utilities” in welfare
economics are normally interpersonally comparable.2 This is because policy evaluations are
not always straightforward cases in which all social members are made better or worse o↵.
In most cases, a policy may benefit some social members’ wellbeing while simultaneously
harming others.3 Before a decision is made on this kind of question, a society needs to be
able to compare one individual’s loss with another’s gain. In other words, the ability to
balance the gains and losses allocated to di↵erent social members is an essential requirement
2Harsanyi (1955, p.316-320) repeatedly emphasised this assumption, which appeared unusual in his time.
Researchers are now almost agreed that this kind of interpersonal comparison is meaningful, at least to some
extent. The utilities in this thesis are interpersonally comparable.
3For example, in Iphigenia in Aulis, the Greek leader needed to decide whether to sacrifice his daughter
so that the fleet could sail for Troy.
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in conducting policy assessment. A less explicit assumption in a considerable part of the
literature is that “utility” not only has an ordinal meaning but also a cardinal meaning.4
With interpersonally comparable utility built in, the quality of a policy can be uniquely
captured by the aggregated utility value it brings to the whole society. Thus, under welfare
economics, the policy-making problem is simplified to the establishment of a policy that
brings maximal utilities to the society.5
2.2 Harsanyi’s Work
This section examines the main di culty remaining in policy assessment; that is, what
normative principle should be followed when society aggregates information on all social
members’ wellbeing? In other words, how should the utility that a policy brings to society
be maximised? No consensus has been reached within welfare economics; however, most
discussions can be linked to Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955, 1977b) “(preference) utilitarian princi-
ple”. This principle suggests that the social welfare function should be an additive function
of all individuals’ wellbeing and “the best policy should be the one which brings the largest
arithmetic mean of individual wellbeing”. This principle has been both very influential and
much disputed.
In this section, Harsanyi’s work and his contribution will be outlined, highlighting
where disputes have been raised and how they may possibly be solved. In order to standardise
the terminologies, the term “individual” is used to refer to a social member involved in a
social choice problem; the term “observer” is used to refer a social planner, policy maker or
legislator.
4The di↵erence between the ordinal and cardinal utility is the following: if policy A, B can produce
society utility values of 10 and 5 respectively, then an ordinal utility means the numbers can only be used to
generate an order between the social desirability of A,B, while the cardinal utility means that not only can
it be said that A is more socially desirable than B, but also A is exactly twice as desirable as B. The use of
cardinal utility can be seen in Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977b) and Fleming (1952), among others.
5This is analogous to utility maximisation in individual decision making.
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Two main results from Harsanyi’s work have made contributions to two classes of
literature. The first is Harsanyi’s “impartial observer theorem”, which is linked to a long
tradition of moral philosophy and aims to determine how to be a rational, impartial and
sympathetic observer. The second is Harsanyi’s “social aggregation theorem”, which is linked
to discussion of how individual preferences can be aggregated to produce social preferences.
Although both results will be discussed below, the main focus of this thesis will be on the
first result.
2.2.1 Impartial Observer Theorem
Harsanyi’s work on the impartial observer theorem will be elaborated with reference to his
answers to the following three questions:
• Question 1: In what situations can a choice made by an observer be called “moral”?
• Question 2: What behavioural patterns should individuals and observers hold?
• Question 3: What behavioural principle should an observer follow?
This approach is a reasonable way to proceed, as Harsanyi’s work is indebted to the
influence of three intellectual traditions and one analytical branch newly-developed in his
time. Question 1 refers to the influence of the moral tradition of the sympathetic impartial
observer that dates back to Smith (1759), and the moral tradition of pursuing universal
principles that began with Kant (1785); Question 2 refers to the influence of the newly-
developed analytical framework of rational behaviour (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944;
Marschak, 1950); and Question 3 refers to the influence of the utilitarian tradition (Bentham,
1789; Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1874; Edgeworth, 1881).6
6Harsanyi admitted these influences himself. See Harsanyi, 1977a, p.623-624 and Harsanyi, 1955, p.312-
313.
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• Question 1: In what situations can a choice made by an observer be called “moral”?
Largely influenced by Smith and Kant, Harsanyi pursued a universal criterion of moral
choices.7 He argued that a choice can be called “moral” only if a social planner achieves
the highest degree of impersonality when making a decision; that is, the choice is made in
complete ignorance of the planner’s relative position. This idea was first published in 1953
(Harsanyi, 1953, p.434-435) and extended in 1955 (Harsanyi, 1955, p.316). To capture this
idea, suppose someone makes the statement: “I would like to support the new tax policy,
as it will improve my wellbeing”. This may be a very reasonable choice from the speaker’s
point of view; however, it can hardly been regarded as a moral one, since this choice is
obviously based on self-interest. It would become a moral choice if someone were to say: “I
would like to support the new tax policy, even though I don’t know if it will improve or harm
my wellbeing”.8 In Harsanyi’s terms, the first statement is a personal preference, while the
second is a moral (or social) preference. A moral choice can only be derived from a moral
preference, where the decision maker is unaware of his or her position in society.
This idea sheds light on how researchers have proposed that moral choices should
be made. Vickrey (1945) had previously proposed a similar idea, but Harsanyi’s work was
carried out independently. Later, Rawls (1971) again independently proposed a similar
model, called the “original position”. Thus, researchers have to some extent agreed that a
moral choice can be made only if the social planner is placed behind a veil of ignorance,
without the knowledge that he or she can be anyone in society.
Harsanyi proposed that one should deprive oneself of personality and imagine oneself
as an impartial observer. When facing a choice behind the veil of ignorance, an impartial
observer may adopt all of an individual’s preferences through the so-called “acceptance
7For a detailed discussion of what “universal” means here, see also Hare (1952, part III “Ought”).
8A similar debate can be found in the literature, for example Harsanyi (1953, p.434) and Pattanaik (1968).
In reality, people tend to make judgements on various problems based on their own emotionally a↵ected and
biased positions. However, there are occasions when most people will show the same moral preference. For
examples, see Smith (1759).
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principle” (Harsanyi, 1977b, p.52). That is to say, although impartial observers are unaware
of their identity, they can still adopt one individual’s preference if they imagine they would
become that individual, and adopt another individual’s preference if they imagine they would
become that individual. This acceptance principle actually allows an observer to collect
information about the preferences of all individuals involved in decision making.
Once the impartial observer is under a veil of ignorance and has collected all per-
sonal preference information under the principle of acceptance, the next question is what
behavioural patterns this observer should have.
• Question 2: What behavioural patterns should individuals and observers hold?
Harsanyi appears to have been fascinated by axiomatic work on the rational behaviour
theorem, which was newly developed at that time and attributable mainly to von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s work (1944). Von Neumann and Morgenstern suggested four postulates
reflecting their idea of behavioural patterns for a rational individual, leading to the de-
velopment of the expected utility theorem. This theorem suggests that, when faced with
decision-making problems, an individual satisfying these four postulates will behave as if
maximising the expected utility. These axiomatic requirements were similarly proposed by
Marschak (1950), which were directly adopted by Harsanyi (1955, p.312-313). These pos-
tulates will be introduced according to their current refinements, rather than the original
versions in Harsanyi’s work, but the ideas behind these behavioural patterns remain the
same. The four postulates are:
Postulate 1: Complete order
Postulate 1.1 Completeness
Postulate 1.2 Transitivity
Postulate 2: Continuity
Postulate 3: Nontriviality
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Postulate 4: Independence
Harsanyi assumed that both individual and observer preferences should “naturally”
satisfy these four postulates according to the rational behaviour theorem. Therefore, the
first two axioms in Harsanyi’s framework are individual rationality and social rationality.
Axiom A: Individual Rationality – All individuals in a society satisfy the four
postulates; thus, they are all expected utility maximisers.
Axiom B: Social Rationality – The moral preferences of the observer satisfy the
four rational behaviour postulates; thus, the observer is an expected utility maximiser.
Another of Harsanyi’s axioms seeks to link individuals’ preferences with the observer’s
preference. This axiom seems quite natural, requiring an observer to be indi↵erent between
any two social situations if all individuals are indi↵erent.
Axiom C: Individualism – If all individuals are personally indi↵erent between two
social situations, the observer should also be indi↵erent between these two social situations.
• Question 3: What behavioural principle should an observer follow?
The third question Harsanyi aimed to answer is what kind of social welfare criteria
an observer should follow, given the above assumptions. He concluded that the three ax-
ioms would imply that the observer’s social welfare function is a linear combination of all
individual utilities, resulting in utilitarian criteria. It should be emphasised that Harsanyi
did not take the utilitarian principle as an ideological doctrine, like the classical utilitarian
school, but showed that the utilitarian principle can be derived from several pre-agreed ax-
ioms. Although some of these axioms may require reconsideration, Harsanyi’s contribution
in bringing analytical and axiomatic thinking to policy assessments was considerable. This
work can be regarded as the starting point for modern analysis, enabling researchers to es-
cape from a relatively implicit discussion of ideology and to exchange explicit opinions on
the observer’s behavioural pattern.
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2.2.2 Social Aggregation Theorem
Hansanyi’s (1955) second result is the aggregation theorem. No less important than the
impartial observer theorem, this theorem focuses on two di↵erent ways of evaluating social
policies. One is to evaluate from the individual perspective; that is, to collect the individual
utilities of policies, and then aggregate them. The other is to evaluate from a social state-
based perspective; that is, to evaluate the social utilities under each state, and then aggregate
these evaluations. Harsanyi showed that, under his utilitarian principle, the social order of
policies generated by these two approaches are identical; that is, the sum of the expected
individual utilities should be equivalent to the expected social welfare for each social prospect.
This result is normally known as Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem.
Generalisation of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem can be seen in Blackorby, Donaldson
and Weymark (1999), Blackborby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004) and Mongin and Pivato
(2015). Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1999) rephrase Harsanyi’s theorem in terms of
state-contingent alternatives (i.e. Savage’s act space) rather than a classical lottery space,
with a subjective expected utility theorem (but specifically assuming that the subjective
measures are shared by all individuals). Blackborby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004) assume
that the aggregation theorem holds and check what conditions are required. From their
results, the social welfare function needs only to be weighted utilitarianism, which is weaker
than utilitarianism, and only requires additively separable individual utilities. Mongin and
Pivato (2015) use a group of monotonicity axioms, such that a fully separable space is
constructed, showing that a similar result holds.
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2.3 Criticism of Harsanyi’s Work
Harsanyi’s model has received considerable attention; however, it is apparent that some
researchers have been unhappy with its utilitarian criteria, especially the aspect that social
welfare function should be a linear function of individual utilities. While earlier researchers
objected to the utilitarian criteria for being too fair,9 later criticism of Harsanyi’s theorem
came mainly from three researchers who thought that this criterion was not fair enough:
Diamond (1967), Rawls (1971) and Sen (1979). These criticisms all treated the lack of
consideration of fairness in the utilitarian criterion as a serious flaw. However, of the three,
only Diamond’s criticism sought to improve Harsanyi’s approach within welfare economics.
As Harsanyi himself noted, “The most specific criticism (among the three) was Diamond’s,
who at least clearly recognized that my theory can be rejected only if one rejects one or more
of its axioms” (Harsanyi, 1975a, p.314). Rawls’ and Sen’s criticisms were not constructive,
but rather aimed to provide alternative theorems. Thus, Rawls’ and Sen’ disagreements did
not lie explicitly in Harsanyi’s framework but at a more fundamental level. Their criticism
also partly took a non-welfarism perspective, which is a broader debate outwith the scope
of this thesis. These criticisms are reviewed in the following sections.
2.3.1 Diamond’s Criticism
Diamond’s disagreement with Harsanyi was with regard to the certainty principle, which lies
in the independence axiom of social rationality. Example 1 provides a better understanding
of Diamond’s argument.
Example 1: Suppose a society, consisting of two individuals, Ann and Bob, is
9For example, Robbins (1938) thought that the assumption advocated by utilitarianism that all individ-
uals should be counted equally was too fair. He wrote, “I do not believe, and I never have believed, that in
fact men are necessarily equal or should always be judged as such.”
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facing a policy-making problem of how to allocate an indivisible good. Assume, for
both individuals, that obtaining the good represents a utility of 1, while obtaining
nothing represents a utility of 0. Thus, the utility vector (0,1) can be used to
capture the social state in which Bob gets the good and Ann gets nothing, while
the utility vector (1,0) can be used to capture the social state in which Ann gets the
good and Bob gets nothing. Two alternative policies, Policy 1 and Policy 2, are
available. Policy 1 would allocate the good to Bob (yielding a utility vector (0,1))
and Ann (yielding a utility vector (1,0)) with equal probabilities, while Policy 2
would allocate the good to Bob for sure. If society regards these two individuals as
equally important, would the observer be indi↵erent between Policy 1 and Policy
2?
Obviously, Harsanyi believed that society should be indi↵erent between the two poli-
cies, as they yield the same expected utility. However, Diamond’s view was that Policy 1 is
strictly preferable, since it gives Ann at least a “fair shake”, while Policy 2 does not. Dia-
mond summarised his objection as follows: “I am willing to accept the sure-thing principle
for individual choice but not for social choice, since it seems reasonable for an individual to
be concerned solely with final states while society is also interested in the process of choice”
(Diamond, 1967, p.766). In other words, a fair procedure would bring additional utility for
Diamond but not for Harsanyi.
2.3.2 Rawls’ and Sen’s Criticisms
Rawls sought to contribute to the traditional school of social contract, as represented by
Locke, Rousseau and Kant (Rawls, 1971, viii; see also Harsanyi 1975b, p.594), and restricted
his debate to a sense of justice. Thus, Harsanyi and Rawls’ debate can be seen as an extension
of the debate between two traditional schools of social choice: the utilitarian school and the
13
social contract school. In Rawls’ work, policy is agreed through a collective rationality (for
example, Rawls, 1971, p.490); that is, a contract that all individuals would agree to when
they are at the original position and unaware of their identities, rather than each individual
being able to adopt other individuals’ preferences through the acceptance principle and thus
being able to make a social decision, as in Harsanyi’s framework. Based on this fundamental
di↵erence, Rawls developed a di↵erent systematic account. His second principle, known as
the “di↵erence principle”, directly contradicts Harsanyi’s utilitarian principle. In economics,
this principle is interpreted as the “maximin approach”, where the quality of a policy is
decided by the utility level received by the worst-o↵ people. However, Rawls’ criterion was
initially applied to social primary goods rather than utilities.10 If the di↵erence between
primary goods and utilities is waived, then Rawls’ main disagreement with Harsanyi is a
question of whether the probability should be used. As noted by Harsanyi (1977a, p.634):
Yet the di↵erence does not lie in the nature of the two models, which are based
on almost identical qualitative assumptions. Rather, the di↵erence lies in the
decision rules, namely the maximin principle, which is fairly di↵erent in that
Rawls avoids any use of numerical probabilities.
The di↵erence between Rawls and Harsanyi lies in what knowledge the observer has
when facing a choice problem behind a veil of ignorance. For Harsanyi, the observer is
believed to have full information and is only unaware of his or her position; thus a prior
can be formed to make a decision. For Rawls, the impartial observer is given even less
information than in Harsanyi’s case, and this information is insu cient to form a prior in
decision making. Thus, the principle suggested by Rawls is the maximin approach.
Sen’s disagreement with Harsanyi was grounded mainly in his concern that, given the
complexity of the world, the welfare economics framework is unable to capture everything
10This di↵erence is also noted by Sen (1979, p.205).
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fully. Every principle, including the utilitarian principle, seems able to interpret only some
legitimate applications (Sen, 1977, p.298). Sen’s (1979) focus was the equity of the non-
welfarism criterion of “basic capabilities”,11 rather than utilities or primary goods. For him,
the concept of basic capabilities meant “a person being able to do certain basic things”, which
includes “the ability to move out . . . the ability to meet one’s nutritional requirements, the
wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, the power to participate in the social life of the
community” (Sen, 1979, p.218). This work can be seen as a natural extension of Rawls’
work, shifting attention from goods to “what goods do to human beings” (Sen, 1979, p.219).
2.4 Attitudes Towards the Criticism
Given these and many other criticisms, it appears that Harsanyi’s utilitarian principle suf-
fered from serving as a doctrine for solving all social choice problems. Indeed, everyone,
including researchers, has their own opinion on how a social choice should be made, and
there is unlikely to be a universal principle agreed by everyone. Furthermore in applying
this theoretical principle to real-life scenarios, which are more murky and complex than those
in theoretical discussions, such a universal principle is even less likely to exist. Thus, it is
unsurprising to see that each individual principle, including the utilitarian principle, has
restricted explanatory power and cannot capture every scenario.
However, this does not mean that the process of searching for such a universal principle
should be stopped. On the contrary, it means that more research is necessary, which is
consistent with trends in the development of the literature. Most researchers have correctly
understood the initial purpose of the harsh criticisms. The criticisms mentioned above did
not seek to deny Harsanyi’s contribution completely, but rather to provide thoughts on other
dimensions not captured in the utilitarian framework.12 If some thoughts are believed to be
11The capability to pursue happiness is also mentioned by Robbins (1938, p.636).
12This can be seen, for example, in Rawls (1971) and Weymark (1991).
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reasonable and should be incorporated into the discussion, then the next question is how
can this be done? A typical approach, as seen in other sciences, is to build constitutively on
already familiar elements13. Therefore, in the area of social choice problems, the literature
has been built mainly on Harsanyi’s framework. A utilitarian framework, rather than an
alternative, has usually been chosen as the first choice for such a construction because it
is a well-structured and mathematically elegant framework, which significantly reduces the
potential risk of causing confusion.
2.5 Improvements Based on Harsanyi’s Framework
This section examines how improvements have been developed over the last few decades.
As discussed in Section 2.4, these have been made mainly by extending the domain in
which Harsanyi’s theorem can be applied by constantly relaxing or replacing his axioms and
conditions. The focus of this thesis is on how to include the fairness concern in social welfare
evaluations, a classical debate that also lies at the core of the criticisms mentioned in Section
2.3.
As shown above, the aspect of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism theorem which has received
most criticism is its indi↵erence to the distribution of utilities; that is, an impartial observer
under Harsanyi’s theorem would not consider the fairness issue at all. This kind of impartial
observer seems not to match real observations and is also ethically unacceptable to most
researchers. It may be not necessary to pursue the other extreme, as Rawls did, in which a
social observer is only concerned about fairness, but it would be reasonable to believe that the
impartial observer cares about fairness, and that sometimes the e↵ect of this consideration
may be a determining factor in the decision. If the concern of fairness is indeed taken as an
indivisible part of the impartial observer’s preference, as observed by most social planners
13See Machina (1987, p.133) for an application of this approach in economics.
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in daily life, then the question is how to introduce this concern to the observer’s preference.
In Harsanyi’s work, it can be seen that there are two di↵erent ways of calculating
social welfare. The first is to obtain the expected utility for each individual, and then
aggregate these expected individual utilities into an expected utility theorem; the second is
to calculate the expected welfare under each possible state, and then aggregate all these states
into an expected utility theorem. According to the aggregation theorem, these two ways will
be identical under utilitarianism. However, this result will no longer hold if consideration
of equality is introduced. More specifically, within Harsanyi’s framework, introducing the
equity consideration at a social level (while keeping other things unchanged) means that an
impartial observer has to make a decision between “equalisation of expected well-beings” and
the “expected equalization of actual well-beings” (Adler and Sanchirico, 2006). This is why
there are two main directions for improving utilitarianism, namely the ex-ante and ex-post
approaches.
We focus on the ex ante approach in this thesis, since generalisation of Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism has normally been conducted within this approach.14 Also, our work presented
in Chapter 3 is one of them. This generalisation has taken from at least two directions.
One is to bring heterogeneity to Harsanyi’s framework, which can be attributed to
the individual rationality axiom. In his original model, Harsanyi (1977b, p.51-52) required
that impartial observers should have uniform “imaginative empathy”. Similar requirements
were also raised by Arrow (1977, p.159) using di↵erent terminologies. This requirement
basically stipulates that, when impartial observers imagine being each and every individual,
these extended preferences must coincide across all impartial observers. This requirement
ensures that all impartial observer preferences are objective, thus reducing the social choice
14For readers who are interested in the ex post approach, noble discussions can be found in Broome (1978,
1984), Harel et al. (2005), Adler and Sanchirico (2006), Fleurbaey (2010), Grant et al. (2012a), and among
others. For readers who are interested in insightful theories that combine ex ante and ex post approaches,
see Machina (1989), Ben-Porath et al. (1997), Gajdos and Maurin (2004), Chew and Sagi (2012), Saito
(2013), and among others.
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problem to an individual choice problem.15 However, this requirement seemed too demanding
and unrealistic for authors such as Broome (1993) and Mongin (2001), who argued that
impartial observer preferences should be extended from objective assessments to subjective
assessments. This is analogous to Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) work on the rational
behaviour theorem, from which Harsanyi initially developed his theorem.16 For example,
Broome (1993, p.65) wrote:
But that [uniform imaginative empathy] is a fantasy. My position as an academic
causes me to have particular values. Since those are my values, I cannot escape
them, even when I am forming my preferences about lives in which I would not
have those values.
In response to this concern, Grant et al. (2010) used an ex-ante approach to capture
the concern about individual di↵erences in attitudes to risk17. Returning to Example 1, it
might be the case that Ann and Bob have di↵erent attitudes to risk, for example Bob is more
risk loving than Ann. It would then be reasonable to imagine that the impartial observer,
who could fully adopt Ann and Bob’s preferences, would be concerned about this di↵erence
and would take it into consideration.
An interesting variant under this direction must be mentioned. Proposed by Karni
and Safra (2000), it is now clear that Diamond’s (1967) criticism can also be counteracted
15This is also observed by Rawls (1971, p.24), who wrote: “The principle of choice for an association of
men is interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man. Social justice is the principle of
rational prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the group.”
16Savage (1954, p.7), a great contributor to the rational behaviour theorem, wrote: “Rational behaviour
assumes that all individuals in the same position, given the same information will make the same choice”.
He also stated his concern about this assumption: “personally, I doubt it can even be matched roughly with
the reality” (Savage, 1954, p.7). In order to capture more real situations, Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
extended the concept of objective probabilities (as in a dice game) to subjective probabilities (as in a horse
game).
17This concern is remarked by Pattanaik (1968, p.1165-1166), who wrote: “what we are actually doing
is to combine attitudes to risk of more than one person, and although the single individual’s choice among
risky prospects may satisfy the rules of consistency posited by the expected utility axioms, there is no reason
to expect such consistency in the case where more than one person’s attitudes are involved.”
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if individuals are modeled as self-interest-seeking moral beings18. These self-interest-seeking
moral beings are di↵erent to individuals assumed in Harsanyi’s work, since the former adopts
the moral preference even under normal circumstances (not only behind a veil of ignorance).
Another direction in the generalisation of Harsanyi’s work has been to technically
reduce its strict requirement by restricting the domain in which impartial observer prefer-
ences are defined. In Harsanyi’s original work, an observer is required to order all possible
extended lotteries, which is quite demanding. Karni and Weymark (1998) restricted the
domain from all possible extended lotteries to only impartial extended lotteries, a smaller
domain considering only extended lotteries with an equal chance of being any individual
in society. It was noted that situations in which di↵erent individuals might face di↵erent
social alternative lotteries were allowed. Karni and Weymark (1998, p.327, Assumption
A.5) further strengthened the acceptance principle and showed that an analogous result to
Harsanyi’s theorem could be obtained.
Safra and Weissengrin (2003) restricted the domain to constant extended lotteries –
lotteries in which every individual in society faces the same social lottery. In this frame-
work, impartial observers may imagine themselves to have di↵erent probabilities of becoming
di↵erent individuals; that is, under each constant extended lottery, the impartial observer
may have di↵erent identity lotteries. In addition, rather than strengthening the acceptance
principle, as in Karni and Weymark (1998), they replaced the independence axiom by using
a so-called “substitution” axiom (the latter is slight stronger than the former for non-convex
sets, but equivalent for convex sets), and obtained the same result as Harsanyi.19
18This way of modelling follows the tradition of Hume (1740), in which possessing a moral sense is inter-
pretted as inherent in human beings. This view is originally expressed in choice behaviors in Karni (1996)
and then treated axiomatically in Karni and Safra (2002).
19See Grant et al. (2012b) for a third alternative in this direction. In this work, the domain was restricted
to identity lottery/social alternative pairs, which is also strictly smaller than the original domain in Harsanyi’s
work.
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2.6 Fairness in the Real World
Fairness concerns are of paramount importance, not only for normative studies of decisions
behind a veil of ignorance (the focus of Sections 2.1 to 2.5), but also for various studies
focusing on real-life decisions. Such concerns must be delicately considered, for instance in
resolving social issues such as the siting of nuclear waste facilities (Oberholzer-Gee, Bohnet
and Frey, 1997), unemployment due to unfair wages (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), the distribu-
tion of healthcare resources (Cappelen and Norheim, 2005) and many other issues. Chapters
4 and 5 of this thesis will discuss concerns about justice in the context of charitable donations
to cancer research. The primary goal of these two chapters is to understand how justice,
alone or in tandem with other concerns (such as self-interest), a↵ects donation behaviours.
In this thesis, fairness is viewed as a given motive that a↵ects people’s behaviours.
Building on the traditional belief that people are motivated exclusively by self-interest, the
fairness motive has been introduced into mainstream economics by several pioneering re-
searchers. For instance, Rabin’s (1993) incorporation of the fairness motive into game theory
modelling inspired numerous subsequent studies; Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1986) used surveys and rich vignettes to initiate empirical studies test-
ing people’s fairness views in real-life contexts; and Karni and Safra (2002) included moral
value judgements (on procedural fairness) in axiomatisations of individual preference. As a
result of these contributions and many others, Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p.817) stated almost
two decades ago that “By now we have substantial evidence suggesting that fairness motives
a↵ect the behaviour of many people”. Today, central debates around fairness (e.g. Cappelen
et al., 2013; Brock et al., 2013; Cettolin and Riedl, 2016) have progressed from whether it
a↵ects people’s behaviours, to how it a↵ects them. The latter is the focus of this review.
When dealing with real-life decisions, a natural but important first question is: justice
for whom? In other words, whose wishes for justice should be satisfied in social decisions
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such as resolving conflicts? Under a democratic system of governance, researchers commonly
focus on justice for the general public. As Scitovsky (1986, p.3) states, “an important part
of the economist’s task is to find out how well the production and distribution of goods and
services conform to the public’s wishes. The first thing to ascertain in this connection is
what the public’s wishes are.” In both branches of literature to which this thesis contributes
– the construction of justice theories that are in line with generally accepted values, and the
collection of empirical evidence that reveals the public’s wishes on justice – the role of the
general public is tacitly acknowledged.
Since the public’s wishes for justice are wide-ranging, a second question must be
clarified for this thesis is: justice for what? To answer this question, categorisation of the
fairness literature is required. According to Konow (2003), the literature on fairness can be
divided into four distinct “families”: (1) the equality and need family (e.g. Rawls, 1971; Sen,
1979), which calls for equal satisfaction of needs; (2) the utilitarianism and welfare economics
family (e.g. Harsanyi, 1977b), which is based on consequentialist ethics; (3) the equality and
desert family (e.g. Nozick, 1974), which is constructed on the basis of proportionality and
individual responsibility; and (4) the context family (e.g. Elster, 1992; Young, 1994), which
emphasises that justice is context-dependent. Chapter 3 of this thesis will focus on the
utilitarianism and welfare economics family, while Chapters 4 and 5 will refer to the equality
and desert family.
As the utilitarianism and welfare economics family has already been discussed in
Sections 2.1 to 2.5, the focus of this section is on the equality and desert family. Regarded
as “the intellectual progeny of two philosophical traditions: the distributive justice theory of
Aristotle and the natural law/desert theory of John Locke”(Konow, 2003, p.1206), this family
aims to establish the impact of individual factors on just allocations. Individual factors with
distinct individual responsibilities contribute to outcomes, and deserved allocations for each
agent relate to these individual responsibilities. Hence, the key issue of debate is about
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factors for which each individual should be held accountable.
This thesis is interested in only two individual factors: luck and choice. Fairness
principles refer to these two factors can be di↵erentiated according to the degree to which
individuals are held responsible. At one end of this spectrum of fairness principles is strict
egalitarianism (Nielsen, 1985), which does not hold individuals responsible for any causes
of inequality. According to the principle, social redistribution should be based solely on
outcomes. At the opposite end of the spectrum is libertarianism (Nozick, 1974), which
postulates that individuals should bear full responsibility for their circumstances, even if they
are caused by bad luck. Some theories of distributive justice combine egalitarian principles
with concerns for individual responsibility. One of the most notable among these is choice
egalitarianism (Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b; Arneson, 1989; Cappelen et al., 2013), which holds
people responsible for their choices but not for their luck.
Experimental evidence on these competing fairness principles regarding choice and
luck has been collected by Konow (2000) and Cappelen et al. (2007, 2013).20 These studies
were carried out within the framework of two-stage dictator games, in which people’s luck
and choice are traceable.
Konow’s (2000) study focuses solely on choice egalitarianism.21 His main finding is
that, when fairness is the only concern, splits by benevolent dictators, whose pay-o↵s are
fixed and independent of their choices, follow choice egalitarianism exactly. That is, such
splits are proportional to the agents’ respective input levels when the produced resource
is determined through the agents’ choice, but are almost always equal when the produced
resource is determined by random luck.
Rather than examining whether choice egalitarianism alone matters to participants,
as in Konow (2000), Cappelen et.al. (2007) seek to check the prevalence among participants
20See also Frohlich et al. (2004), Cappelen et al. (2010) and Krawczyk (2010).
21For simplicity of terminology, “choice egalitarianism”is used to refer to what Konow (1996, 2000) called
the “accountability principle”. These two principles are identical in this context.
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of the three fairness principles. They mimic a genuine investment environment, in which
participants are able to choose the percentages of endowment they wanted to invest, while
the rate of market return is determined by luck. According to their estimation, substantial
proportions of participants uphold each of the fairness principles, with liberal egalitarianism,
strict egalitarianism and libertarianism supported by 38.1, 43.5 and 18.4 percent respectively.
The main contribution of Cappelen et al. (2013) is their examination of di↵erences
in fairness views between third-party (impartial) spectators and stakeholders. According to
their estimations, substantial proportions of both spectators and stakeholders uphold the
three discussed fairness principles, and the distributions of these population shares are very
similar for spectators and stakeholders. Based on these results, the authors conclude that
spectators and stakeholders act as if they hold the same fairness views.
These previous laboratory experiments provide important insights into possible be-
haviour in real-life situations and guidance for theoretical developments. The potential for
these predictions to be generalised to a wide range of domains hinges on combining theory
with empirical evidence from naturally occurring environments (Winkler and Murphy, 1973;
Harrison and List, 2004). Chapter 4 makes a first step in this direction in the context of
understanding individuals’ attitudes to di↵erent distributive justice principles.
Another gap in the literature is variety in people’s perceptions. Although often as-
sumed away in economics to avoid analytical complexity, this variety is itself an inseparable
part of decision making (Simon, 1955). Chapter 5 contributes to this area by considering
individual risk perceptions for the first time in the justice literature.
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Chapter 3
Fairness and Utilitarianism without
Independence
Abstract: In this work we reconsider Harsanyi’s celebrated (1953, 1955, 1977b) utilitarian
impartial observer theorem. Departing from Harsanyi’s individual-centered approach, we
argue that, when societal decisions are at stake, postulates must not be drawn from indi-
vidualistic behavior. Rather, they should be based on societal norms. Hence, notions like
societal fairness should explicitly be the guiding principles. Continuing this line of thinking,
we state and prove a utilitarian result that, rather than being based on the independence
assumption, is based on the notion of procedural fairness and on symmetric treatment of
societal and individual lotteries.
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“An axiomatic justification of utilitarianism would have more content to it if it
started o↵ at a place somewhat more distant from the ultimate destination” (Sen
1976, page 251)
3.1 Introduction
In this work we reconsider Harsanyi’s celebrated (1953, 1955, 1977b) utilitarian impartial
observer theorem. We propose an approach that puts more emphasis on procedural fairness
and we o↵er a utilitarian result that does not use the independence assumption.
Harsanyi analyzed a society that needs to choose among alternate social policies, each
of which is a probability distribution over a given set of social actions, where the latter
associate outcomes with the society’s members. Every social lottery ` induces a lottery `i on
individual i. Individual i’s preferences <i are known and di↵erent individuals may possess
distinct preferences.
To help determine the optimal social policy, Harsanyi suggested that every individual
is endowed with social preferences. Individuals may develop these preferences by adopting
the role of an impartial observer, thus disregarding their true identities and acting behind
“a veil of ignorance”. Therefore, the impartial observer can form her social preferences by
imagining that she faces not only a lottery ` over social actions, but also a lottery   over
identities. Elements of   can be interpreted as weights associated by the impartial observer
with the di↵erent individuals. Then, the optimal social policy is determined by restricting
attention to the equiprobable lottery  e =
 
1
n , ...,
1
n
 
.
Harsanyi argued strongly for “Bayesian rationality”. That is, he assumed that (among
the other Bayesian postulates) all individuals satisfy the independence assumption of the
expected utility theory, both at their personal and social preference layers. Harsanyi claimed
that this “sound” axiom, together with the so-called acceptance principle (that an impartial
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observer fully adopts individual i’s preferences if she imagines becoming that individual for
sure), would force the impartial observer to be a (weighted) utilitarian. More formally, over
all extended lotteries ( , `) in which the identity and the action lotteries are independently
distributed, the impartial observer’s preferences admit the following representation:
V ( , `) =
X
i2I
 iUi(`i)
where  i is the probability of assuming person i’s identity and Ui(`i) :=
P
x ui(x)`i(x) is
person i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility.
Like Harsanyi, most authors who derived modifications of the utilitarianism result
within the impartial observer framework always assumed the independence axiom (see the
works of Weymark (1991), Karni (1998) and Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra (2010; henceforth
GKPS)).1 Notable exceptions within the related social aggregation framework are Blackorby,
Donaldson and Mongin (2004) and Mongin and Pivato (2015).2
Interestingly, Harsanyi’s entire emphasis on Bayesian rationality was based on an
individual centered approach. Firstly, he assumed that rational individuals must satisfy the
independence assumption and secondly, he claimed that society, by its need to be at least
as rational as its members, must also satisfy independence (Harsanyi 1975). We disagree
with Harsanyi on this. Instead we argue that when societal decision problems are at stake,
postulates must not be drawn from individualistic behavior. Rather, they should be based
on societal norms. Hence, when social preferences are formed, issues like societal fairness
and equity should explicitly be the guiding principles.
In this work we focus on procedural fairness. This principle was first advocated
1A similar observation holds for most of the literature dealing with Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem.
See Zhou (1997), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) and Fleurbaey and
Mongin (2012).
2Unlike the other works (including the current one), these authors consider both ex post and ex ante
analyses (and thus are able to employ Gorman’s (1968) separability theorem).
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by Diamond (1967) and was strongly supported by Sen (e.g., 1977). Its essence can be
illustrated by the following example, which is an adoption of Diamond’s example from the
social aggregation framework to the impartial observer one. Consider a society that needs
to decide on how to allocate an indivisible good between two individuals, 1 and 2, and let
action ai denotes allocating it to individual i. Suppose, as Diamond did, that ui(ai) = 1 for
both i and ui(aj) = 0 for i 6= j (that is, both individuals like the good, receive a utility of
one unit from having it and zero otherwise). As was noted above assume that, when making
a choice, the impartial observer considers the equiprobable identity lottery  e =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
(that
is, she gives equal weights to the two individuals). Also assume that she evaluates all four
outcomes in full agreement with the two individuals and adopts their utilities. The example
can be described by the table
a1 a2
1 1 0
2 0 1
where individuals 1 and 2 correspond to the rows, actions a1 and a2 correspond to the
columns and the entries represent the impartial observer’s utilities. The impartial observer
has two policies at hand: Policy (1), which allocates the good to individual 1 (this policy
is equivalent to choosing action a1 and facing the first column of the table) and Policy
(2), which allocates the good to one of the individuals, depending on the outcome of a
toss of a fair coin (this policy is equivalent to the action lottery 12a
1 + 12a
2). The value of
Policy (1) for Harsanyi’s utilitarian observer is 12 ⇥ 1 + 12 ⇥ 0 = 12 , as is the value of Policy
(2): 12
 
1
2 ⇥ 1 + 12 ⇥ 0
 
+ 12
 
1
2 ⇥ 0 + 12 ⇥ 1
 
= 12 . Hence, the impartial observer is indi↵erent
between the two policies.3 However, Diamond and Sen argued that policy (2) provides both
individuals with a “fair shake” and hence the impartial observer might prefer it.4 This notion
3Note that the impartial observer is also indi↵erent between a1 and a2.
4A long list of real-life applications supporting Diamond’s fairness consideration is provided by Elster
(1989).
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of procedural fairness is expressed in our work by the notion of (weak) convexity over action
lotteries: if, given the identity equiprobable lottery  e, the observer is indi↵erent between
two action lotteries ` and `0 (while two individuals disagree on their ranking) then their
mixtures cannot be worse than them.5
Working in a framework in which the basic building blocks are two di↵erent types
of lotteries, those over identities and those over actions, raises a natural question: should
these types be treated similarly? Harsanyi, by construction, implicitly assumed that they
should. Furthermore, in his own response to Diamond’s concern about fairness, Harsanyi
(1975) argued that even if randomizations were of value for promoting fairness (which he
doubted), any explicit randomization is superfluous since “the great lottery of (pre-)life”
may be viewed as having already given each child an equal chance of being each individual.
That is, it does not matter whether a good is allocated by a (possibly imaginary) lottery
over identities or by a (real) lottery over actions. Put it di↵erently, Harsanyi argued that we
need to be indi↵erent between “accidents of birth” (identity lotteries) and real “life chances”
(action lotteries). On this issue we agree with Harsanyi and just make this assumption
explicit. We call it source indi↵erence.
Despite its innocuous appearance, the conjunction of this assumption with procedural
fairness turns out to be rather forceful. More precisely, the main result of this work shows that
(assuming impartiality) convexity, source indi↵erence and a stronger notion of acceptance
are necessary, and su cient, for utilitarianism.
Since the independence axiom is not assumed here, this result is novel and quite
unexpected. Paraphrasing Sen’s quote, we believe that one could hardly find an axiomatic
justification of utilitarianism that starts o↵ at a place that is more distant from the ultimate
destination than ours.
5Unlike Epstein and Segal (1992), we do not assume that such mixtures are always strictly preferred.
This is in agreement with Sen (1977), who argued that mixtures are not always superior.
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Lastly, our result carries an ‘impossibility flavor’: if societies are required to exhibit
strict inclination towards procedural fairness, then source indi↵erence cannot hold. There-
fore, to accommodate views of authors like Diamond and Sen, the impartial observer must
display preference for action lotteries over identity ones. We elaborate on this in the con-
cluding section.
This work is organized as follows: Section 3.2 sets up the framework, Section 3.3
presents the assumptions, Section 3.4 states, and explains, the utilitarian result and Section
3.5 concludes. Finally, proofs are given in Section 3.6.
3.2 Setup and Notation
Let X = [xmin, xmax] ⇢ R be a compact interval representing all possible outcomes and let
4(X ) denote the set of outcome lotteries, endowed with the weak convergence topology.
With slight abuse of notation, we will let x denote the degenerate outcome lottery that
assigns probability 1 to outcome x. Let T be a denumerable set of potential individual types,
where each type t 2 T is characterized by a preference relation over 4(X ) that is complete,
transitive, continuous (in that the weak upper and lower contour sets are closed), increases
with respect to first-order stochastic-dominance and its asymmetric part is nonempty. The
set of individuals under consideration is I = [t2TIt, where It is a denumerable (infinite) set
of type t individuals. In the sequel, individuals are denoted by i, j (and their preferences
by <i, <j), without explicitly specifying their types. A society I is a finite subset of I.
Note that, even though we allow for societies in which some individuals are of the same
type, these individuals may receive di↵erent outcomes and hence they need not be treated
similarly. Also note that our framework departs from Harsanyi’s in that, instead of working
with one fixed finite society, we consider all finite subsets of I.6
6Dealing with a large set of potential members of various societies is justified by our pursuit for a general
rule, to be applied to all societies. Note that Harsanyi too (like other scholars) wanted his theory to be
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A social policy, or an action, associates an outcome with every individual and hence is
represented by a function a : I ! X . The set of all actions, endowed with the corresponding
product topology, is denoted by A (two extreme actions, amax and amin, defined by amax (i) =
xmax and amin (i) = xmin for all i, respectively, will be used in the sequel). Let 4(A) denote
the set of simple lotteries (lotteries with finite support) over actions, with typical elements
denoted by `. With slight abuse of notation, we will let a denote the degenerate action
lottery that assigns probability 1 to action a. A lottery ` 2 4(A) is sometimes written as
` =
P
a2Supp(`) ` (a) a.
Following Harsanyi, an observer imagines herself behind a veil of ignorance, uncertain
about which identity she will assume in the given society. Let 4(I) denote the set of simple
identity lotteries on I, where typical elements are denoted by   (where  i is the probability
assigned by the identity lottery   to individual i). These lotteries represent the imaginary
risks in the mind of the observer of being born as someone else. With slight abuse of notation,
we will let i denote the degenerate identity lottery that assigns probability 1 to individual
i. An imaginary lottery   2 4(I) is sometimes written as   = Pi2Supp( )  ii. When the
observer is faced with pairs of identity and action lotteries, it is assumed that they are
independently distributed.
The observer is endowed with a preference relation < defined over the space of all
product lotteries 4(I) ⇥ 4(A). We assume throughout that < is complete, transitive,
continuous and that its asymmetric part   is nonempty. These assumptions imply that <
admits a (nontrivial) continuous representation V : 4(I) ⇥ 4(A) ! R. That is, for any
pair of product lotteries ( , `) and ( 0, `0), ( , `) < ( 0, `0) if and only if V ( , `) > V ( 0, `0).
Note that the observer might not be indi↵erent between getting some amount x under two
di↵erent identities (this may happen, for example, if she values a rmative action policies).
applied to a large set of societies. The need for an infinite set of individuals is clarified in the proof of the
theorem.
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As a result, there exists no objective natural order over the set of basic identity-outcome pairs
(i, x) and, therefore, monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic-dominance relative
to outcomes cannot be assumed. Instead, we require a weaker notion of monotonicity, based
on the observer’s subjective ranking over I ⇥ X (ImV stands for the image of V )
Definition 1. Monotonicity : For any pair of product lotteries ( , a) and ( 0, a0),
X
{i:V (i,a)6v}
  (i) 6
X
{i:V (i,a0)6v}
 0 (i) for all v 2 ImV ) ( , a) < ( 0, a0)
That is, a product lottery ( , a) is preferred over another product lottery ( 0, a0) (both
having degenerate action lotteries), if the probability of getting identity-action pairs with
utilities not greater than v is always smaller under the first product lottery. Note that
monotonicity is an ordinal condition that does not depend upon the choice of the numerical
representation V .
For a given society I, let 4(I) denote the set of identity lotteries over I.
Definition 2. Utilitarianism: The observer is a utilitarian if, for every society I ⇢ I, her
preferences restricted to 4(I)⇥4(A) admit a representation of the form
V ( , `) =
X
i2I
 iUi (`i)
where `i 2 4(X ) is the lottery faced by individual i (i.e., `i(x) =
P
{a2supp(l):a(i)=x} ` (a)) and
Ui (`i) :=
P
x2X ui (x) `i (x) is an expected utility (EU) representation of <i.
As is well-known, the main behavioral property that characterizes EU preferences is
independence:
Definition 3. Independence: Let <˜ be a preference relation on 4(X ). Then, for all
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p, q, r 2 4(X ) and for all   2 [0, 1],
p<˜q )  p+ (1   ) r<˜ q + (1   ) r
3.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions on <:
Axiom 1. Impartiality : For any two individuals i, j 2 I,
(1) for all ` 2 4(A), <i = <j and `i = `j ) (i, `) ⇠ (j, `)
(2) (i, amax) s (j, amax) and (i, amin) s (j, amin)
Part (1) of this axiom states that, given an action lottery `, if two individuals i and
j with identical preferences are faced with the same action lottery, then the observer is
indi↵erent between facing `, while being individual i, and facing `, while being individual
j. This requirement seems quite natural. Part (2) says that being individual i and getting
the most preferred outcome xmax is assumed ethically equivalent to being individual j and
getting the (same) most preferred outcome xmax. As was convincingly explained by Karni
(1998) who, in a di↵erent framework, employed a stronger axiom to derive utilitarianism,
“This value judgment ... is obtained by default. The methodological framework of revealed
preference provides no ground for preferring one individual’s most preferred alternative over
that of the other. Consequently, strict preference in either direction is either biased or
involves considerations other than the rank order of the alternatives”. Clearly, the same
applies to the worst outcome xmin. A similar notion lies behind Segal’s (2000) dictatorship
indi↵erence axiom.
Henceforth we assume that the observer preferences satisfy the impartiality axiom.
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To emphasize it, we call her an impartial observer.
Axiom 2. Strong acceptance: For all i 2 I and `, `0 2   (A) satisfying 8j 6= i `j = `0j, if
 i > 0 then
`i <i `0i , ( , `) < ( , `0)
This axiom states that the impartial observer sympathizes with individual i and fully
adopts his preferences when she imagines herself being this individual with a positive prob-
ability, and when all other individuals are una↵ected by her choice. This axiom strengthens
Harsanyi’s acceptance principle, according to which this sympathy holds for  i = 1. Axiom
2 also is analogous to an axiom called strong Pareto, a version of Harsanyi’s Pareto prin-
ciple that was used in his aggregation analysis (see Harsanyi (1955), Weymark (1991) and
Epstein and Segal (1992)).7 To see the connection between our axiom and the strong Pareto
principle note that, by sequentially applying our axiom, the following property holds: for
any `, `0 2   (A), if `i <i `0i for all i 2 Supp ( ) then ( , `) < ( , `0).8 In a sense, strong
acceptance unifies two of Harsanyi’s main ideas, taken from his two famous analyses of social
choice theory. Finally, our axiom is analogous to Karni’s (1998) sympathy assumption.
The strong acceptance axiom enables us to express the impartial observer’s function V
as a social welfare function. That is, V can be expressed as a functionW that, instead of the
action lottery `, depends on the individuals’ utilities associated with their induced lotteries `i.
More formally, let Vi (`i) := V (i, `) be a representing utility the impartial observer attaches
to individual i preferences. Note that, by impartiality, Vi (xmin) = Vj (xmin) := vmin and
Vi (xmax) = Vj (xmax) := vmax, for all i, j 2 I, and hence by continuity, the image of Vi, for
7Strong Pareto: For a given society I, (1) for all lotteries `, `0 2   (A), if `i <i `0i for all i, then ` < `0
and (2) if, furthermore, there exists an individual i0 such that `i0  i0 `0i0 , then `   `0.
8To see it, assume without loss of generality that Supp ( ) = {1, 2, ..., n} and note that
( , `) = ( , (`1, `2, ..., `n)) < ( , (`01, `2, ..., `n)) < ( , (`01, `02, ..., `n)) < · · · < ( , (`01, `02, ..., `0n)) = ( , `0)
33
all i, is equal to the closed interval [vmin, vmax]. Then, strong acceptance implies that V ( , `)
can be written as W
⇣
~ , ~V (`)
⌘
, where W is defined over 4([vmin, vmax]), the set of lotteries
over all attainable utility values in which, for all i 2 Supp ( ), ~ i =  i is the probability of
attaining
⇣
~V (`)
⌘
i
= Vi (`i). To see how W is constructed assume, for expositional clarity,
that Supp ( ) = {1, ..., n}. Then, given V and Vi, for any   2 4({1, ..., n}) and ~v =
(v1, ..., vn) 2 [vmin, vmax]n, define W by W (~ ,~v) := V ( , `), for the imaginary lottery  
satisfying  i = ~ i and for any ` satisfying vi = Vi (`i), for all i 2 {1, ..., n}. By strong
acceptance, W is well defined. Furthermore for a given ~ , W is monotonic increasing with
respect to vi whenever ~ i > 0. Note that, by construction, W satisfies W (1, v) = v, for all
v 2 [vmin, vmax].
The following properties will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 1. Assume the observer satisfies impartiality and strong acceptance. Then
(a) for all `, `0 2 4(A),
<i = <j and `i = `0j ) (i, `) ⇠ (j, `0)
(b) for all ( , `) 2 4(I)⇥4(A),
(i, `) ⇠ (j, `) for all i, j 2 Supp ( ) ) ( , `) ⇠ (k, `) , for all k 2 Supp ( )
(c) for all ( e, `) , ( e, `0) 2 4(I) ⇥ 4(A), where Supp ( e) = {1, ..., n}, if there exists a
permutation ⇡ on {1, ..., n} such that (i, `i) s
⇣
⇡ (i) , `0⇡(i)
⌘
for all i, then
( e, `) ⇠ ( e, `0)
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The proof appears in Section 3.6.1.
Axiom 3. Convexity : Consider an equiprobable lottery  e 2 4(I) and two lotteries `, `0 2
4(A) for which there exist two individuals i, j 2 I satisfying `i  i `0i and `j  j `0j. Then, for
all   2 (0, 1),
( e, `) ⇠ ( e, `0) ) ( e,  `+ (1   ) `0) < ( e, `)
As was explained in the introduction, this axiom is an expression of procedural fairness
and is in agreement with Diamond’s critique.
We include the requirement of having two individuals with opposing preferences since
procedural fairness has greater appeal when real conflict exists. However, it is straightforward
to verify that, with continuity, this requirement can be omitted. Hence, in situations where
only one individual faces distinct lotteries under the action lotteries ` and `0, convexity
implies that his preferences must also be convex.
Convexity is also related to social stability. Consider a society I ⇢ I, whose set of
available actions is given by a finite A ⇢ A. For a given identity lottery   2 4(I), the
impartial observer’s aim is to find the optimal action lottery that maximizes her utility.
That is, the impartial observer seeks to solve the problem
max
`24(A)
V ( , `)
For societal stability, it is desirable that the set of optimal action lotteries does not change
drastically when only minor changes occur. That is, we want this set to be upper hemi-
continuous and convex valued with respect to the set of available actions A. Clearly, the
continuity of < implies upper hemi-continuity, while convexity is equivalent to the optimal
set being a convex valued correspondence.
Axiom 4. Source indi↵erence: For all societies {i1, ..., in} and for all sets of available actions
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{a1, ..., an}, if there exists k 2 {1, ..., n} such that  ij, ak  s (ik, aj) for all j, then
 
 e, ak
  ⇠ (ik, `e)
where  e =
Pn
j=1
1
n ij and `
e =
Pn
j=1
1
na
j.
To illustrate, consider the following matrix
a1 a2 · · · ak · · · an
i1 x1
i2 x2
...
...
ik y1 y2 · · · z · · · yn
...
...
in xn
and suppose that the impartial observer is indi↵erent between the following two options, for
all j: (1) receiving an outcome xj while facing the deterministic action ak and imagining
being individual ij, and (2) receiving an outcome yj while facing the deterministic action
aj and imagining being individual ik. There are two ways to randomize, with equal prob-
abilities, over these degenerate pairs of equivalent product lotteries. The product lottery 
 e, ak
 
randomizes over identity lotteries (for the given action ak), while product lottery
(ik, `e) randomizes over action lotteries (for the given individual ik). Then, as was argued
by Harsanyi in his response to Diamond and was implicitly assumed by him, the impartial
observer should be indi↵erent between the two randomizations. We want to emphasize that,
a priori, there is no clear reason to prefer either of these lotteries. Moreover, and as is
explained in the next section (Comment 4), our utilitarian result holds even if Axiom 4 is
relaxed and only requires (weak) preference of identity lotteries.
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The following lemma shows that, given impartiality and strong acceptance, source
indi↵erence for equiprobability lotteries  e and `e implies that this property holds for all
lotteries   and ` . This property will be used later on.
Lemma 2. Assume the observer satisfies impartiality, strong acceptance and source indif-
ference. For all societies {i1, ..., in} and for all sets of available actions {a1, ..., an}, if there
exists k 2 {1, ..., n} such that  ij, ak  s (ik, aj) for all j, then, for all   = Pnj=1  ij ij and
`  =
Pn
j=1  ija
j,  
 , ak
  ⇠ (ik, ` )
The proof is relegated to Section 3.6.1.
3.4 Utilitarianism
Our main result shows that the preceding axioms force all individuals to be of the EU
type and, in addition, the impartial observer must be a utilitarian. That is, the behavioral
assumptions on the impartial observer preferences induce her, as well as all individuals, to
satisfy the independence axiom. This is achieved without imposing independence explicitly
(neither on individuals nor on the observer).
Theorem. Assume the observer satisfies impartiality. Then her preferences satisfy strong
acceptance, convexity and source indi↵erence if, and only if, all individuals in I satisfy
independence and the observer is a utilitarian.
The proof, which is relegated to Section 3.6.2, consists of two parts. First, we prove that
all individuals in I must satisfy the independence axiom. Then, we demonstrate that the
impartial observer’s preferences can be represented by a weighted average of the individual
utilities.
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Comment 1. Consider the Diamond example, represented by the table
a1 a2
1 1 0
2 0 1
Having the identity lottery  e =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
, choosing action ai corresponds to the pair ( e, ai),
while tossing a fair coin corresponds to the pair ( e, `e) =
 
 e, 12a
1 + 12a
2
 
. By source in-
di↵erence, ( e, a1) ⇠ (1, `e) and ( e, a1) ⇠ (2, `e). Hence, (1, `e) ⇠ (2, `e) and therefore, by
Lemma 1(b), (1, `e) ⇠ ( e, `e). But then, by transitivity, ( e, a1) ⇠ ( e, `e) and the impartial
observer is indi↵erent between the first action (Policy (1)) and the mixture (Policy (2)). Put
di↵erently, she does not strictly prefer tossing a fair coin over the pure action a1. Moreover,
it can now be seen (proof omitted) that, by convexity, any mixture of the two actions a1
and a2 must be indi↵erent to a1. This may seem like a significant step towards proving
utilitarianism. However, the derivation of these ‘straight line indi↵erence segments’ from
the above extremely symmetric situation does not extend to the general case and cannot be
utilized to derive a utilitarian representation.
Comment 2. As noted in the introduction, Blackorby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004) and
Mongin and Pivato (2015) also derived utilitarianism without imposing independence. Al-
though these authors work within Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem framework, a comparison
to our theorem seems natural and is carried out by focusing on the analysis of Mongin and
Pivato (2015). Consider a given society I, with a set of actions A, and identify every product
lottery ( , `) with a matrix whose rows correspond to individuals and columns correspond
to actions. Mongin and Pivato’s ex ante analysis is manifested by their row preference as-
sumption, an assumption that is analogous to our strong acceptance axiom. Similarly, their
ex post analysis is manifested by a column preference assumption that, in our model, would
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require an improvement in the impartial observer’s situation whenever an action a is replaced
by a better action a¯. Together with a coordinate monotonicity assumption, these two as-
sumptions enable Mongin and Pivato to employ Gorman’s (1968) separability theorem and
derive a fully separable representation of the observer preferences. As can be seen in Section
3.6.2, our proof uses di↵erent arguments. Nevertheless, one might conjecture that, since
source indi↵erence implies similar treatment of columns and rows then, together with strong
acceptance, Gorman’s separability theorem could be applied to yield our result. However,
this is not true. As can be seen in Examples 1 and 2 below, strong acceptance and source
indi↵erence are not su cient to imply utilitarianism.
Comment 3. Another result that is close to ours appears in GKPS (2010). Their Theorem
3 roughly states that an observer is a utilitarian if and only if she satisfies acceptance,
independence over identity lotteries and their notion of source indi↵erence. We depart from
their work in at least three aspects. First, since GKPS (2010) maintain the independence
over identity lotteries (for the observer) while we do not assume any form of independence
(neither for individuals nor the observer), the current result is stronger than theirs. It
should also be noted that the notion of source indi↵erence used by GKPS (2010) (they
termed it ‘indi↵erence between identity and action lotteries’) is stronger than ours. This is
formally stated as Lemma 4, which can be seen in Section 3.6.4. Last but not least, our
characterisation is based on the societal norm procedural fairness. This is novel and di↵erent
to GKPS (2010) (and many other previous works), where the utilitarian characterisation is
derived from individual behaviours.
As usual, we present the necessity of each axiom. The following first two examples
demonstrate the necessity of convexity. The third demonstrates the necessity of source indif-
ference. The fourth demonstrates the necessity of strong acceptance. It is worth mentioning
that, since the generalized utilitarian impartial observer of GPKS (2010) in Example 3 sat-
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isfies independence but not source indi↵erence, this example justifies the di↵erence between
these two axioms.
Example 1. Here we present a non utilitarian impartial observer who satisfies all axioms
except for convexity. Assume that all preferences <i of individuals i 2 I belong to the rank-
dependent utility class (RDU; see Weymark (1981) and Quiggin (1982)). Let g : [0, 1] !
[0, 1] be an increasing and onto function. For a given simple lottery r and z 2 Supp (r)
define Fr (z) :=
P
y6z r (y), Fr (z ) :=
P
y<z r (y) and rg (z; r) := g (Fr (z))   g (Fr (z )).
On simple lotteries, RDU preferences are represented by a function of the form V (p) =P
x u (x)rg (x; p). When g is the identity function, rg (x; p) = p (x) and RDU preferences
are reduced to EU preferences. We assume that, in the eyes of the impartial observer,
individual i’s preferences are represented by Vi (p) =
P
x ui (x)rg (x; p), where g is common
to all individuals and, for all i, j 2 I, ui (xmin) = uj (xmin) and ui (xmax) = uj (xmax). The
observer preferences are also of the RDU type and are represented by
V r ( , `) =
X
i2I
Vi (`i)rg (Vi (`i) ;  )
Impartiality and strong acceptance are satisfied by construction. To verify that source
indi↵erence is satisfied consider, without loss of generality, a society I = {1, ..., n}, a set of
available actions {a1, ..., an} and assume that there exists k for which V r  j, ak  = V r (k, aj)
for all j. Then, for all j,
uj
 
ak (j)
 
= Vj
 
ak (j)
 
= V r
 
j, ak
 
= V r
 
k, aj
 
= Vk
 
aj (k)
 
= uk
 
aj (k)
 
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Hence,
V r
 
 e, ak
 
=
X
j2I
uj
 
ak (j)
 rg  uj  ak (j)  ;  e 
=
X
j2I
uk
 
aj (k)
 rg  uj  ak (j)  ;  e 
=
X
j2I
uk
 
aj (k)
 rg  aj (k) ; `ek  = V r (k, `e)
as required.
To see that convexity does not hold assume that g is strictly concave and fix j 2 I.
Let `, `0 2   (A) be two distinct action lotteries satisfying `i = `0i for all i 6= j, `j 6=
`0j and Vj (`j) = Vj
 
`0j
 
(clearly, such lotteries exist). The strict concavity of g implies
Vj
 
1
2`j +
1
2`
0
j
 
< Vj (`j) and hence, for any   with  j > 0, V r
 
 , 12`+
1
2`
0  < V r ( , `).9
Note that, as the following case shows, non-convexity of <i (which is manifested by
the concavity of g), is not necessary for the non-convexity of <. For this, let I = {1, ..., 5},
9Perhaps the simplest way to see it is to observe that, for continuous lotteries, Vj (`j) =R
z uj (z) dg
 
F`j (z)
 
= uj (xmax) 
R
z g
 
F`j (z)
 
u0j (z) dz. Therefore
Vj
✓
1
2
`j +
1
2
`0j
◆
= uj (xmax) 
Z
z
g
⇣
F 1
2 `j+
1
2 `
0
j
(z)
⌘
u0j (z) dz
= uj (xmax) 
Z
z
g
✓
1
2
F`j (z) +
1
2
F`0j (z)
◆
u0j (z) dz
< uj (xmax) 
Z
z

1
2
g
 
F`j (z)
 
+
1
2
g
⇣
F`0j (z)
⌘ 
u0j (z) dz
=
1
2

uj (xmax) 
Z
z
g
 
F`j (z)
 
u0j (z) dz
 
+
1
2

uj (xmax) 
Z
z
g
⇣
F`0j (z)
⌘
u0j (z) dz
 
=
1
2
Vj (`j) +
1
2
Vj
 
`0j
 
= Vj (`j)
Similarly, if g is convex then so is <j .
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consider the two actions described by the following matrix (the entries are the utility values)
a1 a2
1 1 0
2 0 1
3 1 1
4 1 1
5 1 1
let g be given by the convex piecewise linear function
g (t) =
8><>: 0 t 6 0.2 14 + 54t otherwise
and note that, by the convexity of g, each <i is convex.
Clearly, for both j = 1, 2,
V r
 
 e, aj
 
= g (0.2)⇥ 0 + (1  g (0.2))⇥ 1 = 1
Next, consider the lottery 12a
1 + 12a
2. For i 2 {1, 2},
Vi
✓
1
2
a1 (i) +
1
2
a2 (i)
◆
= g (0.5)⇥ 0 + (1  g (0.5))⇥ 1 = 5
8
while, for i 2 {3, 4, 5}, Vi
 
1
2a
1 (i) + 12a
2 (i)
 
= 1. Hence, for the impartial observer,
V r
✓
 e,
1
2
a1 +
1
2
a2
◆
= g (0.4)⇥ 5
8
+ (1  g (0.4))⇥ 1
=
1
4
⇥ 5
8
+
3
4
⇥ 1 = 29
32
< 1
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and convexity is not satisfied.
Example 2. In the two cases described in Example 1, either individual preferences are
non-convex with respect to outcome lotteries (when g is concave) or the impartial observer
preferences are non-convex with respect to identity lotteries (when g is convex). This might
suggest that convexity would be satisfied if all preferences involved were convex. As we now
show, this conjecture is false.
Assume that individual preferences are weighted utility (WU; see Chew (1983)). That
is, for all i and p 2 4(X ),
Vi (p) = V (p) =
X
k
pk
w (xk)P
j pjw (xj)
u (xk)
where u is a strictly increasing utility function and w is a non constant and positive weighting
function. These preferences belong to the betweenness class (see Chew (1989) and Dekel
(1986)), a class that is characterized by the property: for all lotteries p and q, p < q if and
only if p <  p + (1   ) q < q, for all   2 (0, 1). Clearly, betweenness implies that WU
preferences are convex.
The impartial observer preferences are of the same type and are given by
V w ( , `) =
X
i
 i
w (u 1 (V (`i)))P
j  jw (u
 1 (V (`j)))
V (`i)
As in Example 1, source indi↵erence is satisfied. To see it, assume (for k = 1)
V w (j, a1 (j)) = V w (1, aj (1)), for all j. That is, u (a1 (j)) = u (aj (1)) or, equivalently,
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a1 (j) = aj (1), for all j. Then
V w
 
 e, a1
 
=
X
i
1
n
w ((u 1   u) (a1 (i)))P
j
1
nw ((u
 1   u) (a1 (j)))u
 
a1 (i)
 
=
X
i
1
n
w (a1 (i))P
j
1
nw (a
1 (j))
u
 
a1 (i)
 
=
X
i
1
n
w (ai (1))P
j
1
nw (a
j (1))
u
 
ai (1)
 
= V w (1, `e)
Next we show that convexity is not satisfied. Consider again the Diamond’s example.
Assume that u(x) = x and w(x) = 2 + x.10 Then,
V w
 
 e, a1
 
=
1
2w (1)
1
2w (1) +
1
2w (0)
=
0.5⇥ 3
0.5⇥ 3 + 0.5⇥ 2 =
3
5
and
V w
 
 e, a2
 
=
1
2w (1)
1
2w (0) +
1
2w (1)
=
0.5⇥ 3
0.5⇥ 2 + 0.5⇥ 3 =
3
5
Let ` = 0.8a1 + 0.2a2 be a mixture of a1 and a2. Then,
V (`1) =
0.8w (1)
0.8w (1) + 0.2w (0)
=
0.8⇥ 3
0.8⇥ 3 + 0.2⇥ 2 =
6
7
V (`2) =
0.2w (1)
0.8w (0) + 0.2w (1)
=
0.2⇥ 3
0.8⇥ 2 + 0.2⇥ 3 =
3
11
10WU preferences increase with respect to first-order stochastic-dominance when w and w ·u are bounded
on the outcome interval ([0, 1] in this example) and when w(x)(u(x)  u(s)) is monotonic increasing in x for
all s 2 [0, 1]. Clearly, these conditions are satisfied.
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and, for the impartial observer,
V w ( e, `) =
1
2
w (u 1 (V (`1)))
1
2w (u
 1 (V (`1))) + 12w (u
 1 (V (`2)))
V (`1)
+
1
2
w (u 1 (V (`2)))
1
2w (u
 1 (V (`2))) + 12w (u
 1 (V (`2)))
V (`2)
=
20
7
20
7 +
25
11
⇥ 6
7
+
25
11
20
7 +
25
11
⇥ 3
11
=
44
79
⇥ 6
7
+
35
79
⇥ 3
11
⇡ 0.598 < 3
5
Hence, convexity is violated.
Example 3. A non utilitarian impartial observer who satisfies all axioms except for source
indi↵erence is the generalized utilitarian impartial observer of GKPS (2010). Consider
V g ( , `) =
X
i2I
 i i [Ui (`i)]
where  i : [vmin, vmax] ! R are strictly concave, for all i. It is easy to verify that strong
acceptance and convexity are satisfied while, as was shown in GKPS, this observer deems
identity lotteries inferior to action lotteries.
Example 4. Here we present a non utilitarian impartial observer who satisfies all axioms
except strong acceptance. Consider an impartial observer whose preferences are represented
by
V d ( , `) =
X
i2I
X
x
 i`i(x)x
That is, the impartial observer evaluates any pair of product lottery ( , `) by its expected
values. Convexity and source indi↵erence are clearly satisfied. While, since individual pref-
erences are always ignored by the observer, strong acceptance is not satisfied.
Comment 4. Consider the following assumption, which is weaker than source indi↵erence.
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Preference for identity lotteries : For all societies {i1, ..., in} and for all sets of available
actions {a1, ..., an}, if there exists k 2 {1, ..., n} such that  ij, ak  s (ik, aj) for all j, then
 
 e, ak
 
< (ik, `e)
In Section 3.6.3 (Lemma 3) we show that this assumption, in conjunction with strong
acceptance and convexity, implies source indi↵erence. Therefore, our theorem could be stated
in a slightly stronger form. The current form is chosen because, having no reason to prefer
either type of these lotteries, source indi↵erence seems the more natural choice. Moreover,
it is more in line with Harsanyi’s own arguments.
3.5 Conclusion
As stated in the introduction we argue that, when societal decisions are at stake, postulates
must be drawn from society centered behavior. We have chosen to focus on the notion
of procedural fairness (exhibited by convexity) and added to it the requirement that the
impartial observer is indi↵erent between identity and action lotteries. In our main result we
have shown that these two assumptions (together with strong acceptance) were su cient to
force the impartial observer to be a utilitarian. Unlike most utilitarian results, no form of
the independence axiom was required here.
In addition to o↵ering a society centered basis for utilitarianism, our result sheds more
light on what is needed in order to always have a strict preference for procedural fairness.
Since preference for identity lotteries implies source indi↵erence (Lemma 3, Section 3.6.3)
then, in order to have a strict preference for procedural fairness, the impartial observer
must display a preference for action lotteries. Two such non-utilitarian models exist in the
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literature. The first follows from Karni and Safra (2000).11 In their model, which leads to the
representation V ( , `) =
P
i2I  iVi (`i), individuals possess a sense of justice and preference
for procedural fairness is solely manifested by their behavior (their utilities Vi are assumed
to be concave). It can easily be verified that this impartial observer displays a preference for
action lotteries. The second model is the generalized utilitarian impartial observer of GKPS
(2010). As mentioned above, GKPS show that a preference for action lotteries holds if and
only if each  i is concave, a condition that implies procedural fairness. For a third model,
consider a rank dependent, or a Gini, impartial observer, whose preferences are represented
by
V rd ( , `) =
X
i2I
 (Ui (`i))rg (Ui (`i) ;  )
(where each Ui is of the EU type and both   and g are concave). As can easily be verified,
a preference for action lotteries follows from Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) while procedural
fairness follows from Quiggin (1993, Section 9.1).
11See also Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra (2012b).
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3.6 Appendix: Proofs
3.6.1 Proofs of Lemmata 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1
(a) Assume <i=<j and consider `, `0 2 4(A) satisfying `i = `0j. Construct an action lottery
¯` that satisfies ¯`i = ¯`j = `i = `0j. Then
(i, `) ⇠  i, ¯`  ⇠  j, ¯`  ⇠ (j, `0)
as required (the first and the last indi↵erences follow from strong acceptance while the second
follows from impartiality).
(b) Let v = V (i, `) = Vi (`i) and note that, by the arguments that precede the statement of
the lemma, V ( , `) = W (~ , (v, ..., v)) while V (k, `) = W (1, v). That is, the product lottery
( , `) is equivalent to a utility lottery with n identical outcomes (where n is the number
of elements in Supp ( )), all equal to v, while (k, `) is equivalent to the degenerate lottery
that yields v for sure. The two utility lotteries seem identical but, in order to show that the
impartial observer is indeed indi↵erent between them, the monotonicity property must be
employed.
For this, let ci (`i) 2 X be individual i’s certainty equivalent of the lottery `i (that
is, ci (`i) ⇠i `i) and consider the action aˆ satisfying aˆ (i) = ci (`i). By strong acceptance,
( , `) ⇠ ( , aˆ) and (k, `) ⇠ (k, aˆ). Then, as the unique utility value attained by both ( , aˆ)
and (k, aˆ) is v, monotonicity implies that ( , aˆ) ⇠ (k, aˆ). By transitivity, ( , `) ⇠ (k, `).
(c) Let ( e, `), ( e, `0) and ⇡ satisfy the conditions of the lemma. Construct two actions aˆ and
aˆ0 satisfying aˆ (i) = ci (`i) and aˆ0 (i) = ci (`0i) where, as above, ci is the certainty equivalent
function of individual i. By strong acceptance, ( e, `) ⇠ ( e, aˆ) and ( e, `0) ⇠ ( e, aˆ0). The
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conditions (i, `i) s
⇣
⇡ (i) , `0⇡(i)
⌘
imply V (i, `i) = V
⇣
⇡ (i) , `0⇡(i)
⌘
for all i, and hence,
V (i, aˆ) = V (i, ci (`i)) = V (i, `i) = V
 
⇡ (i) , `0⇡(i)
 
= V
 
⇡ (i) , c⇡(i)
 
`0⇡(i)
  
= V (⇡ (i) , aˆ0)
By monotonicity, ( e, aˆ) ⇠ ( e, aˆ0) and, by transitivity, ( e, `) ⇠ ( e, `0). ⌅
Proof of Lemma 2 Consider, without loss of generality, a society I = {1, ..., n}, a set of
available actions A = {a1, ..., an} and assume that (again, without loss of generality) (i, a1) ⇠
(1, ai), for all i. Let   = ( 1, ...,  n).
First assume that   is rational. That is,  i =
ni
mi
, for all i. Consider a new society
I¯ = {1¯, 2¯, ...} with m1 · · ·mn individuals, in which the first n1m2 · · ·mn individuals are
identical to individual 1 of I, the next m1n2m3 · · ·mn individuals are identical to individual
2 of I, and so on. Similarly, let the set of actions A¯ = {a¯1, a¯2, ...} consists ofm1 · · ·mn actions,
in which the first n1m2 · · ·mn actions are identical to action a1 of A, the next m1n2m3 · · ·mn
actions are identical to action a2 of A, and so on. Finally, let  ¯e and ¯`e be the equiprobability
lotteries over I¯ and A¯, respectively. By construction, (¯ı, a¯1) ⇠ (1¯, a¯ı¯), for all ı¯. By source
indi↵erence, ( ¯e, a¯1) ⇠  1¯, ¯`e . To conclude note that, by monotonicity, ( , a1) ⇠ ( ¯e, a¯1)
and, by Lemma 1(a),
 
1¯, ¯`e
  ⇠ (1, ` ). Transitivity then implies ( , a1) ⇠ (1, ` ).
Next consider any   and let  k !k!1   be a sequence of rational lotteries that
converge to  . By construction, ( k, a1) !k!1 ( , a1) and
 
1, ` k
  !k!1 (1, ` ). By the
argument above, ( k, a1) ⇠
 
1, ` k
 
for all k and hence, by continuity, ( , a1) ⇠ (1, ` ). ⌅
3.6.2 Proof of the Theorem
The ‘if’ part is immediate. The proof of the converse is divided into two parts.
Part I12 In this part we show that all individuals satisfy the independence axiom. Consider
12The proof of this part is similar to that of Dekel, Safra and Segal (1991, Theorem 2). However, dealing
with social multi-person framework, our proof is more general than (and improves upon) theirs.
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an individual i⇤ 2 I and denote his preferences by <⇤. We want to demonstrate that for all
p, q, r 2 4(X ), p s⇤ q ) 12p+ 12r s⇤ 12q+ 12r. This, using Herstein and Milnor (1953), would
imply that <⇤ satisfies the independence axiom. Using the continuity of <⇤, we can restrict
attention to equiprobability lotteries with the same number of outcomes: p =
  
1
k , ...,
1
k
 
, x
 
,
q =
  
1
k , ...,
1
k
 
, y
 
, and r =
  
1
k , ...,
1
k
 
, z
 
(to see it, note that (1) any lottery with rational
probabilities can be replicated by an equiprobability lottery with not necessarily distinct
outcomes and (2) the set of lotteries with rational probabilities is dense in the space of all
lotteries).
Consider a society I consisting of n = 2k individuals, all with preferences <i = <⇤.
Let ⇡1 = (1, 2, ..., n), ⇡2 = (2, 3, ..., 1),..., ⇡n = (n, 1, 2, ..., n 1) be permutations on {1, ..., n}
(where ⇡j(i) stands for the ith element of the permutation ⇡j). We concentrate on a set of
actions A˙ = {a˙1, ..., a˙n} available to the society that are defined as follows: for j = 1, ..., k
a˙j (i) =
8><>: x⇡j(i) if 1 6 i 6 kz⇡j(i k) if k < i 6 n
and, for j = k + 1, ..., n
a˙j (i) =
8><>: z⇡j k(i) if 1 6 i 6 kx⇡j k(i k) if k < i 6 n
To illustrate, look at the following table
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a˙1 a˙2 · · · a˙k a˙k+1 a˙k+2 · · · a˙n
1 x1 x2 · · · xk z1 z2 · · · zk
2 x2 x3 · · · x1 z2 z3 · · · z1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
k xk x1 · · · xk 1 zk z1 · · · zk 1
k + 1 z1 z2 · · · zk x1 x2 · · · xk
k + 2 z2 z3 · · · z1 x2 x3 · · · x1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
n zk z1 · · · zk 1 xk x1 · · · xk 1
Fact 1 ( e, `e) s ( e, a˙1).
Since for all i, j `ei = `
e
j , impartiality implies (i, `
e) s (j, `e) and hence, by Lemma 1(b),
( e, `e) s (1, `e). Next, since a˙j (1) = a˙1 (j) (xj if j 6 k and zj k otherwise) then, in both
(1, a˙j) and (j, a˙1), the impartial observer faces the same deterministic outcome. By Lemma
1(a), (1, a˙j) s (j, a˙1) for all j 2 I and, by source indi↵erence, (1, `e) s ( e, a˙1). Transitivity
then implies ( e, `e) s ( e, a˙1).
Fact 2 Let `k = 1k
Pk
j=1 a˙
j. Then
 
 e, `k
 
s ( e, `e).
Since all actions a˙i yield the same outcomes then, using impartiality and monotonicity,
( e, a˙i) s ( e, a˙1) for all i. By repeated application of convexity,
 
 e, `k
 
=
⇣
 e, 1k
Pk
j=1 a˙
j
⌘
<
( e, a˙1).13 Hence, by Fact 1 and transitivity,
 
 e, `k
 
< ( e, `e).
For the converse, consider the action lottery ˆ`k = 1k
Pn
j=k+1 a˙
j. For all i = 1, ..., k, ˆ`ki ,
the lottery individual i faces under ˆ`k, is identical to `kk+i, the lottery that individual k + i
faces under `k. By Lemma 1(a),
⇣
i, ˆ`ki
⌘
⇠  k + i, `kk+i . Similarly, ˆ`kk+i, the lottery individual
13Note that by continuity, the convexity axiom holds even when there are no opposing individuals (see
Section 3.3, right after the statement of the convexity axiom).
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k+ i faces under ˆ`k, is identical to `ki , the lottery that individual i faces under `
k and hence,
by Lemma 1(a),
⇣
k + i, ˆ`kk+i
⌘
⇠  i, `ki  . Therefore, by Lemma 1(c), ⇣ e, ˆ`k⌘ s   e, `k .
Since `e = 12
ˆ`k + 12`
k, convexity implies ( e, `e) <
 
 e, `k
 
.
Hence,
 
 e, `k
 
s ( e, `e).
Fact 3 12p+
1
2r s
⇤ 1
2q +
1
2r.
By the first part of the proof of Fact 1, ( e, `e) s (1, `e). Therefore, using transitivity and
Fact 2,
 
 e, `k
 
s (1, `e). Note that in the first lottery, the first k individuals face the lottery
p and the rest face the lottery r while, in the second, individual 1 is faced with the lottery
1
2p+
1
2r.
Next consider the same set of individuals I with another set of actions A˜ =
 
a˜1, ..., a˜2k
 
,
that is derived from A˙ by replacing every xj by yj. Clearly, a similar conclusion holds: the
impartial observer is indi↵erent between the product lottery
⇣
 e, ˜`k
⌘
, in which the first k
individuals face the lottery q and the rest face the lottery r, and the product lottery
⇣
1, ˜`e
⌘
,
in which individual 1 is faced with the lottery 12q +
1
2r. But as p s
⇤ q, all individuals in I
are indi↵erent between p and q and hence, by strong acceptance,
 
 e, `k
  ⇠ ⇣ e, ˜`k⌘. By
transitivity, (1, `e) s
⇣
1, ˜`e
⌘
. Hence the impartial observer, while imagining herself being
individual 1, is indi↵erent between the lotteries 12p+
1
2r and
1
2q+
1
2r. By strong acceptance,
1
2p+
1
2r s
⇤ 1
2q +
1
2r.
To conclude Part I, note that allowing k to go to infinity implies that <⇤ satisfies
independence over the entire set of lotteries 4(X ).14
Part II In the second part we show that the impartial observer is a utilitarian. Consider
a society I (without loss of generality, I = {1, ..., n}) and let V ( , `) be a representation
of the impartial observer preferences where V (i, `) = Vi (`i) = 'i (Ui (`i)), 'i is monotonic
increasing and, by Part I, Ui (`i) =
P
x2X ui (x) `i (x) is an EU representation of individual i’s
14This is where we make use of the infinity of the set I.
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preferences. Since ui is determined up to (positive) a ne transformations, we can assume it
satisfies ui (xmin) = vmin and ui (xmax) = vmax (hence, 'i (vmin) = vmin and 'i (vmax) = vmax,
for all i).
Fact 4 < can be represented by a separable function V¯ ( , `) =Pni=1  i i [Ui (`i)].
Choose ( , `) 2   (I) ⇥   (A), denote vi = 'i (Ui (`i)) and let ci (`i) 2 X be individual
i’s certainty equivalent of the lottery `i (that is, ui (ci (`i)) = Ui (`i)). Consider a set of
actions Aˆ = {aˆj | j 2 {1, ..., n}} satisfying aˆ1 (i) = ci (`i) and aˆj (1) = ('1   u1) 1 (vj) for
i, j = 1, ..., n. By construction, V (i, aˆ1) = ('i   ui) (ci (`i)) = vi and V (1, aˆi) = ('1   u1)  
('1   u1) 1 (vi) = vi. Hence (i, aˆ1) s (1, aˆi) and, by source indi↵erence and Lemma 2,
( , aˆ1) s (1, ` ) (`  is the action lottery on Aˆ associated with  ). Put di↵erently, V ( , aˆ1) =
V (1, ` ). Note that by strong acceptance, V ( , `) = V ( , aˆ1). Therefore,
V ( , `) = V
 
 , aˆ1
 
= V (1, ` ) = '1 (U1 (`
 
1))
= '1
 
nX
i=1
 iu1
 
('1   u1) 1 (vi)
 !
= '1
 
nX
i=1
 i'
 1
1 (vi)
!
= '1
 
nX
i=1
 i
 
' 11   'i
 
(Ui (`i))
!
Denote V¯ = ' 11   V and  i = ' 11   'i (note that V¯ also represents the impartial
observer preferences and its image is [vmin, vmax]). By the above,
V¯ ( , `) =
nX
i=1
 i i [Ui (`i)]
Fact 5 < can be represented by the a ne function V¯ ( , `) =Pni=1  iUi (`i).
To conclude, we show that for all i, V¯i =  i   Ui is a ne which, given 'i (vmin) = vmin and
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'i (vmax) = vmax, implies V¯i = Ui. Take `, `0 2   (A). Since Ui is of the EU type, we have
for all   2 [0, 1],
V¯i ( `i + (1   ) `0i) =  i [Ui ( `i + (1   ) `0i)] =  i [ Ui (`i) + (1   )Ui (`0i)] (3.1)
=  i [ ui (ci (`i)) + (1   ) ui (ci (`0i))]
=  i [Ui ( ci (`i) + (1   ) ci (`0i))]
= V¯i
 
 aˇi (i) + (1   ) aˇj (i)  = V¯  i, aˇi + (1   ) aˇj 
for actions aˇi and aˇj satisfying aˇi (i) = ci (`i), aˇj (i) = ci (`0i) (note that the element  ci (`i)+
(1   ) ci (`0i) that appears in the third line is a lottery, not an outcome). Defining aˇi (j) =
( j   uj) 1   ( i   ui) (ci (`0i)) we get
V¯
 
j, aˇi
 
= ( j   uj)   ( j   uj) 1   ( i   ui) (ci (`0i)) = ( i   ui) (ci (`0i)) = V¯
 
i, aˇj
 
and hence, by source indi↵erence and for   satisfying  i =  ,  j = 1   and  k = 0 otherwise,
V¯
 
i, aˇi + (1   ) aˇj  = V¯   i+ (1   ) j, aˇi 
(note that actions aˇk for k 6= i, j are irrelevant but can easily be defined so as to fit with
the requirements of the axiom). Now, by the structure of V¯ and by using the equation
V¯ (j, aˇi) = V¯ (i, aˇj),
V¯
 
 i+ (1   ) j, aˇi  =  V¯  i, aˇi + (1   ) V¯  j, aˇi  =  V¯  i, aˇi + (1   ) V¯  i, aˇj 
=  V¯i
 
aˇi (i)
 
+ (1   ) V¯i
 
aˇj (i)
 
=  V¯i (ci (`i)) + (1   ) V¯i (ci (`0i))
=  V¯i (`i) + (1   ) V¯i (`0i)
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Summarizing (using equation 3.1),
V¯i ( `i + (1   ) `0i) =  V¯i (`i) + (1   ) V¯i (`0i)
and the a nity of V¯i is established.
Hence,
V¯ ( , `) =
nX
i=1
 iUi (`i)
as required. ⌅
3.6.3 Preference for Identity Lotteries vs Source Indi↵erence
Lemma 3 If the impartial observer preferences satisfy strong acceptance, convexity and
preference for identity lotteries then they satisfy source indi↵erence.
Proof Consider, without loss of generality, a society I = {1, ..., n}, a set of available actions
A = {a1, ..., an} and assume that (again, without loss of generality) V (i, a1) = V (1, ai) := vi,
for all i. Without loss of generality we can assume that all vi are pairwise di↵erent and that
vi > vi+1 for all i < n. For i, j 2 {1, ..., n}, let xij 2 X be defined by Vi (xij) = v⇡j(i), where
⇡j is a permutation on {1, ..., n} (as defined in the proof of the theorem), and note that, by
the monotonicity of each Vi with respect to the outcomes of X , V1 (x11) > V1 (x12) > · · · >
V1 (x1n), V2 (x2n) > V2 (x21) > V2 (x22) > · · · > V2
 
x2(n 1)
 
,...,Vn (xn2) > Vn (xn3) > · · · >
Vn (xnn) > Vn (xn1). Consider a new set of actions A¯ = {a¯1, ..., a¯n} satisfying a¯j (i) = xij.
By construction,
V
 
i, a¯1
 
= Vi (xi1) = v⇡1(i) = vi = V
 
i, a1
 
and
V
 
1, a¯i
 
= V1 (x1i) = v⇡i(1) = vi = V
 
1, ai
 
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which implies that, by strong acceptance, V ( e, a1) = W ( e, (v1, ..., vn)) = V ( e, a¯1) and
V (1, `e), given A, is equal to V (1, `e), given A¯. Hence it is su cient to restrict atten-
tion to A¯ and to show that V ( e, a¯1) = V (1, `e) (given A¯). For this note that: (i)
since V ( e, a¯i) = W ( e, (v1, ..., vn)) for all i, we have V ( e, a¯i) = V ( e, a¯j), for all i, j;
(ii) by construction, for every k 2 {1, ..., n}, V  i, a¯k  = V (k, a¯i), for all i; (iii) V ( e, `e) 2
[mini V (i, `e) ,maxi V (i, `e)] and hence, if V ( e, `e) = maxi V (i, `e) then V ( e, `e) = V (i, `e) =
V (j, `e), for all i, j; and (iv) individual i strictly prefers action a¯n+2 i (where a¯n+2 1 =
a¯n+1 := a¯1) over all other actions and, by the monotonicity of Vi with respect to first-order
stochastic-dominance, he strictly prefers action a¯i over all mixtures of the other actions.
Therefore,
V
 
 e, a¯1
 
= max
k
V
 
 e, a¯k
 
> max
k
V (k, `e) > V ( e, `e) > V
 
 e, a¯1
 
where the equality follows from (i), the first inequality follows from (ii) and from preference
for identity lotteries, the second inequality follows from the first part of (iii) and the last
inequality follows from (iv) by repeated application of convexity (note that `e = 1n
P
j a¯
j).
Since the first and the last elements are identical, maxk V (k, `e) = V ( e, `e) which,
by the second part of (iii), implies that V (1, `e) = maxk V (k, `e) and, therefore, V (1, `e) =
V ( e, a¯1). Hence the impartial observer is indi↵erent between identity and action lotteries.
⌅
3.6.4 GKPS’s (2010) Source Indi↵erence Implies Ours
Lemma 4 Assume (as in GKPS 2010) that the impartial observer satisfies the following
property:
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8 ,  0 2 4(I), 8`, `0 2 4(A) and 8  2 (0, 1),
( , `0) ⇠ ( 0, `)) (   + (1   )  0, `) s ( ,  `+ (1   ) `0)
Then the impartial observer exhibits source indi↵erence.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Without loss of generality, consider a society I =
{1, ..., n}, the set of available actions A = {a1, ..., an} and assume that (1, ai) s (i, a1), for
all i.
First let n = 2. By the GKPS. condition, (1, a2) s (2, a1) implies
(
1
2
1 +
1
2
2, a1) s (1, 1
2
a1 +
1
2
a2)
as required.
Next assume it holds for n   1 and consider n. Assume, without loss of generality,
that the acts of A satisfy (i, aj) s (i + 1, aj 1) for all i 2 {1, ..., n  1}, j 2 {2, ..., n}.
Consider the society Ir1 = {2, ..., n} and the set of actions Arn = {a1, ..., an 1}. By con-
struction, (2, ai) s (i+ 1, a1) for all i = 1, ..., n  1 and hence, by the induction hypothesis,
( 1n 1
Pn
i=2 i, a
1) s (2, 1n 1
Pn 1
i=1 a
i). Next apply the same argument to Irn = {1, ..., n  1}
andArn = {a1, ..., an 1}, where (2, ai)s (i, a2) for all i, to get (2, 1n 1
Pn 1
i=1 a
i) s ( 1n 1
Pn 1
i=1 i, a
2).
Finally, apply it to Irn = {1, ..., n  1} and Ar1 = {a2, ..., an}, where (1, ai+1) s (i, a2) for
all i, to get ( 1n 1
Pn 1
i=1 i, a
2) s (1, 1n 1
Pn
i=2 a
i). By transitivity,
(
1
n  1
nX
i=2
i, a1) s (1, 1
n  1
nX
i=2
ai)
To conclude, mix both sides of the last indi↵erence with (1, a1) and, by the GKPS. condition,
obtain (↵e, a1) s (1, `e) for I = {1, ..., n} and A = {a1, ..., an}, as required. ⌅
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Chapter 4
Social Justice and Risk Perceptions:
An Analysis of Contributions to
Cancer Research
Abstract: The last few decades have witnessed an increasing proportion of all cancers are
lifestyle-related, a trend tends to continue. To assess policies used to address this challenge
and to construct a more equitable healthcare system, it is important to gain a better un-
derstanding of how individual responsibility is viewed by individual society members. We
have constructed a procedure to assess these preferences with respect to lifestyle-related and
hereditary cancers by eliciting donations to these two types of cancers. Lifestyle-related
cancers involve greater individual responsibility than hereditary cancers, as individuals can
control more elements of lifestyle than heredity. The results of implementing our procedure
via an online survey demonstrate that subjects take individual responsibility into account
by donating about twice as much to cancers with less individual responsibility. Their choices
are also a↵ected by group identity, perceptions of cancer likelihood and social demographics.
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“Do heavy smokers who contract lung cancer have the same claim, on equity
grounds, to resources them to full health (so far as that might be possible) as
nonsmokers who contract the diseases?” – Le Grand 1987, page 263-264
4.1 Introduction
As a result of decades of scientific research, it is increasingly clear that personal choices -
unhealthy lifestyles - contribute significantly to the chances of contracting diseases (World
Health Organization, 2002). In a liberal society, where individual lifestyles are freely cho-
sen, the ethics of healthcare policy1 consist in part in determining the fair distribution for
each: how di↵erences in individual choices should be reflected? While the moral principle
that people should be held responsible for their personal choice to remain healthy is widely
accepted in Western societies, interpretations and applications of this principle are largely at
issue (Wikler, 2002; Brownell et al., 2010; Greenfield, 2011). For instance, the classic issue of
whether alcoholics should be excluded from liver transplantation has attracted both contro-
versial debates (Cohen and Benjamin, 1991; Moss and Siegler, 1991; Sherman and Williams,
1995) and policies (The Guardian, 2014). To compromise controversy, a democratic solution
is to reflect and understand individual society members’ attitudes to individual responsibility.
This essay contributes to this direction, theoretically and empirically, by scrutinizing
public preferences in distributing donations between research on lifestyle-related and hered-
itary cancers. We consider, for the first time, how such preferences may be a↵ected by
individual risk perceptions.
Variety of people’s perceptions, although often assumed away in economics to avoid
complexity in analysis, is itself an inseparable part of decision making (Simon, 1955).2 In
1To clarify the scope of this paper, note that the term “healthcare” is di↵erent from “health”. The former
is one of causal factors for the latter.
2The problems studied in the risk analysis literature on how people’s risk perceptions vary across groups
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this study, we restrict our attention to two aspects of risk perceptions that matter to distri-
bution choices. First, people’s perceptions of cancer risks may di↵er. For instance, physical
inactivity is perceived to be a crucial cancer risk for some, but not for others. Similarly,
some may perceive cancers as more likely to be linked with lifestyle than others. To capture
these di↵erences, we have developed a novel procedure that incorporates people’s estimates
of various likelihoods linked with cancers.
Second, people’s perceptions of cancer risks may be ambiguous. One information
source that largely shapes such perceptions is scientific evidence and its associated media
coverage. However, this evidence is inconclusive. A recent example that attracted public
attention was around prevention rates (i.e., how many cancers are preventable and involve
individual responsibility). In 2015, Tomasetti and Vogelstein (2015) estimated that the ma-
jority of cancers are due to “bad luck” and are completely out of people’s control. However,
only a few months later, Wu et al. (2016) provided contradictory evidence, suggesting 70%
to 90% of cancers are due to avoidable, extrinsic risk factors. Such inconclusiveness may
prevent people from forming unambiguous risk perceptions. Therefore, to capture the po-
tential ambiguity of cancer risks, we use interval probabilities (Flage et al., 2014) allowing
subjects to report both intervals of estimates and single estimates.
In constructing our theoretical models and designing our surveys, we made two key
decisions that merit discussion. First, while the literature on fairness preferences normally
ignore ambiguity, we bring the ambiguous risk perceptions to the forefront of analysing
fairness preferences. The significance of ambiguity in decision making is no longer a secret
in economics, and there seems no reason that our decisions involving fairness considerations
can be an exception. In a related but di↵erent study, Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) has
showed that ambiguity in the distributional situations (i.e., what is the likelihood that the
are di↵erent to the problem we consider here. However, the finding that risk perceptions di↵er, for example
by status (e.g., Slovic, 1987) and gender (e.g., Flynn, Slovic and Mertz, 1994; Gustafsod, 1998), provides
important insights into how to think about the variety of risk perceptions.
60
unfairness is caused by your decisions) may indeed influence fairness preferences. We study
the e↵ect of ambiguity in risk perceptions here. The distributive decisions in our settings
can be influenced by both amount of ambiguity and fairness preferences, but this is not
a confound in the design. Rather, by explicitly controlling and separating the e↵ect of
ambiguity in risk perceptions that implicitly lies in the distribution problems, our design
allows a clear pattern of fairness preferences.
Second, while our focus in this chapter and next chapter is the fairness principles on
individual responsibility, another interesting dimension worth attention is the ex ante and
ex post nature of these problems. As will become clear, our naturally-occurring data in
the next chapter does not allow to di↵erentiate between the ex ante and ex post principles.
For this reason, rather than modelling the trade-o↵ between ex ante and ex post principle,
our purpose of considering those two principles in the theoretical parts is to show that the
testable predictions of the models are robust to these two thoughts of the fairness principle.
Interesting questions like how individuals invest between prevention and treatment are left
for future research.
In the empirical section of this paper, we also record a couple of perceived group
identities, including highly publicized cancer cases. We are particularly interested in how
Angelina Jolie’s proclaimed medical decision to prevent hereditary cancers (The New York
Times, 2013) may influence people’s donating choices. In the theoretical section, we develop
a novel and testable model of to explain how distributions of donations between research on
hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers may be a↵ected by potential beneficiaries’ individ-
ual responsibility. Two types of donors, choice egalitarian and non-choice egalitarian, are
modelled, and the former are distinguished from the latter by focusing on individual respon-
sibility in contracting diseases. We have two main theoretical predictions. First, a society
consisting of both types of donor will allocate more funds to hereditary cancers. Second,
an increase in donors’ ambiguity about individual responsibility will result in a decrease in
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donations to lifestyle-related cancers.
Our empirical data, collected through an online survey based on a representative sam-
ple, support both theoretical predictions. The subjects allocated twice as much to alterna-
tives with less individual responsibility than to those with more individual responsibility, and
their ambiguity in individual responsibility was negatively related to donations to lifestyle-
related cancers. Apart from these two results, we also find a self-interest incentive exhibited
in various dimensions.
The previous literature regarding justice in health care distributions can be divided
into two main categories. One makes specific proposal directly (see, e.g., Le Grand, 1987;
Culyer and Wagsta↵, 1993; Cappelen and Norheim, 2005; Brownell et al., 2010). The other,
to which this study contributes, reveals public’s preferences on distribution fairness, and
leaves the final decision on how to reflect these preferences in health care to the political level
(Yaari and Bar-Hiller, 1984; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Konow, 2000; Cappelen
et al., 2007; Cappelen, Sørensen and Tungodden, 2010; Cappelen et al., 2013; Cettolin and
Riedl, 2016; Melkonyan, Safra and Ma, 2016). These papers have greatly improved our
knowledge of distributive justice. However, the present study di↵ers from all of them by
considering di↵erences in risk perceptions and ambiguity.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on conditional altruism (see, e.g., Rabin,
1993; Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg, 2003; Konow, 2010). This branch of literature argues
that people’s altruism is conditional on compliance with moral norms. Since being respon-
sible for one’s own choices may be interpreted as one such moral norm, our results resonate
well with this branch of literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model and its
predictions are described in Section 2. The empirical model and results are presented in
Section 3. The last section draws conclusions.
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4.2 Theoretical Model
Consider a donor who is endowed with a sum of £100 to donate to cancer research. The
sum can be allocated either to a (typical) hereditary cancer or to a (typical) lifestyle-related
cancer. The donor’s utility depends on the utilities of potential beneficiaries, who are cancer
patients benefitting from improved treatment and a better prevention policy. In what fol-
lows, we first consider the case where the donor perceives risk about the adverse outcomes
associated with having a cancer. For the case of risk, we begin with characterizing the
optimal donations to cancer treatment and then turn to the optimal donations to cancer
prevention. After the analysis of choices under risk, we examine the case of ambiguity and,
similarly to the risk scenario, we first analyze the cancer treatment and then the cancer
prevention.
4.2.1 Donations under Risk
4.2.1.1 Donations to Cancer Treatment
Suppose the donor allocates £100 between two projects with each a↵ecting a distinct cancer
patient, one su↵ering from a hereditary cancer, denoted by hr, and the other su↵ering from
a lifestyle-related cancer, denoted by ls. We will call the patients su↵ering from cancers
hr and ls as patients hr and ls, respectively. Let d 2 [0, 100] denote the amount allocated
to cancer hr (therefore, 100   d is allocated to cancer ls). The donor assumes that her
donation positively a↵ects the e↵ectiveness of cancer treatment. That is, the donation goes
toward cancer research which increases the corresponding patients’ probability of survival,
also called survival rate. The survival rates for the two cancers are assumed, for simplicity,
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to be equal to each other and given by
ps (d) = p
0
s +
 
1  p0s
 
  (d) , (4.1)
where p0s 2 (0, 1) denotes the current survival rate, which is also assumed to be identical
across the two cancers, and   : R+ ! [0, 1) is an onto, strictly increasing and strictly
concave function with   (0) = 0.3 The survival rate function represents the donor’s beliefs
that (1) her donation has a positive e↵ect on the survival rate and (2) the size of the e↵ect
is negatively related to the current survival rate. Note that all values of ps (d) fall between
the current survival rate and 1.
It is assumed that surviving a cancer, an outcome denoted by H, gives both patients,
in the eyes of the donor, a utility of one unit; uhr (H) = uls (H) = 1. Dying from a cancer,
an outcome denoted byM , yields a lower utility. The utility of patient hr under contingency
M , as perceived by the donor, is assumed to be zero; uhr (M) = 0. The utility attached by
the donor to patient ls, on the other hand, depends on whether or not the donor “penalizes”
patient ls for his cancer-inducing behavior. To model this possibility, let pa 2 (0, 1) denote
the probability that cancer ls is induced by a specific, avoidable, lifestyle (by definition, the
corresponding probability for cancer hr is equal to zero). A choice egalitarian donor realizes
that unhealthy lifestyle is a decision made by supposedly informed individuals and presumes
that patients following such lifestyle care less about their possible death. Thus, this donor
assumes that the utility di↵erence for patient ls between outcomes H and M is smaller
than that of patient hr. More specifically, the choice egalitarian donor assigns uls (M) = pa.
Hence, the utility di↵erence between the two health outcomes is uls (H)  uls (M) = 1  pa,
which is decreasing with the probability that cancer ls is lifestyle-related. A donor who is
not choice egalitarian uses uls (M) = 0 in her evaluation. Thus, by assigning the same utility
3It is assumed that   (·) and function   (·) of the next section satisfy standard Inada (1963) conditions
that warrant interior solutions.
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to patients hr and ls under both contingencies this donor doesn’t di↵erentiate between the
two types of patients.
The non-choice egalitarian donor assigns the (ex ante) expected utilities EUhrn and
EU lsn to patients hr and ls, respectively. It follows from our assumptions that
EUhrn = ps (d) u
hr (H) + (1  ps (d)) uhr (M) = ps (d) , (4.2)
EU lsn = ps (100  d) uls (H) + (1  ps (100  d)) uls (M) = ps (100  d) .
The non-choice egalitarian donor’s objective function Vn (d) is given by the sum of the (ex
ante) expected utilities EUhrn and EU
ls
n , which using (4.2) can be written as:
Vn (d) = EU
hr
n + EU
ls
n = ps (d) + ps (100  d) .
The non-choice egalitarian donor’s optimal choice of donation is given by the first-order
condition4 of her optimization problem:
@
@d
Vn (d) = p
0
s (d)  p0s (100  d) (4.3)
=
 
1  p0s
 
[ 0 (d)   0 (100  d)] = 0.
The choice egalitarian donor assigns the (ex ante) expected utilities EUhrch and EU
ls
ch
4The first-order condition is su cient by strict concavity of the objective function:
@2
@d2
Vn (d) =
 
1  p0s
 
[ 00 (d) +  00 (100  d)] < 0.
Similarly, all of the other objective functions considered in the paper are strictly concave.
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to patients hr and ls, respectively. It follows from our assumptions that
EUhrch = ps (d) u
hr (H) + (1  ps (d)) uhr (M) = ps (d) = EUhrn , (4.4)
EU lsch = ps (100  d) uls (H) + (1  ps (100  d)) uls (M)
= ps (100  d) + pa (1  ps (100  d)) > EU lsn .
The choice egalitarian donor’s objective function Vch (d) is given by the sum of the (ex ante)
expected utilities EUhrch and EU
ls
ch, which using (4.4) can be written as:
Vch (d) = EU
hr
ch + EU
ls
ch = ps (d) + ps (100  d) + pa (1  ps (100  d)) .
It then follows that her optimal choice of donation is given by
@
@d
Vch (d) = p
0
s (d)  (1  pa) p0s (100  d) (4.5)
=
 
1  p0s
 
[ 0 (d)  (1  pa)  0 (100  d)] = 0.
A comparison of the donation choices of the two donor types in (4.3) and (4.5) leads
to (the proofs of all propositions are in Appendix A):
Proposition 1 Consider a society that consists of both choice egalitarian and non-choice
egalitarian donors. Suppose that each donor is given £100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both allocations are for research that improves treatment
of the disease. Then the average allocation to the hereditary cancer is larger than that for
the lifestyle-related cancer.
Thus, unless all of the donors are non-choice egalitarian, the hereditary cancer will
receive a larger donation. It also follows immediately from the derivations leading to Propo-
sition 1 that the larger the share of choice egalitarian donors the larger the total contribution
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to the hereditary cancer.
4.2.1.2 Donations to Cancer Prevention
Similarly to the analysis for the cancer treatment case, we assume that the donor considers
two cancer patients, hr and ls, and that d 2 [0, 100] denotes the amount allocated to cancer
hr. Here, the donor focuses on contributing to research to prevent cancer and assumes
that her donation positively a↵ects cancer prevention by decreasing the potential patients’
probability of getting the cancer. Let phrc (d) and p
ls
c (d) denote the resulting cancer incidence
rates, which for brevity are called cancer rates, for cancers hr and ls, respectively. The cancer
rates for the two cancer types are assumed to be equal to each other and given by
pc (d) = p
0
c  (d) ,
where p0c 2 (0, 1) denotes the current cancer rate, which is also assumed to be identical
across the two cancers, and   : R+ ! (0, 1] is an onto, strictly decreasing and strictly convex
function (note that   (0) = 1). Similarly to the preceding subsection, the cancer rate function
represents the donor’s beliefs that (1) her donation can a↵ect cancer rates and (2) the size
of the e↵ect is negatively related to the current cancer rate. All values of pc (d) are between
the current cancer rate and 0. The survival rates for both cancers are fixed and equal to
ps 2 (0, 1).
It is assumed that either not getting a cancer, or surviving it and being healthy, is
represented by the same outcome H for both potential patients. Hence, in the eyes of the
donor, uhr (H) = uls (H) = 1.5 Dying from a cancer, an outcome denoted by M , yields
the same utilities as in the previous section: uhr (M) = 0 and uls (M) = pa for the choice
5For simplicity, it is assumed that the outcome when the individual doesn’t get the cancer yields her the
same utility as the outcome when she gets the cancer and then gets cured. All of our results hold under the
assumption when the latter outcome yields a lower utility.
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egalitarian donor while uls (M) = 0 for the non-choice egalitarian donor.
The non-choice egalitarian donor assigns the (ex ante) expected utilities EUhrn and
EU lsn to patients hr and ls, respectively.
6 We have that
EUhrn = (1  pc (d)) uhr (H) + pc (d)
 
psu
hr (H) + (1  ps) uhr (M)
 
(4.6)
= 1  (1  ps) pc (d) ,
EU lsn = (1  pc (100  d)) uls (H) + pc (100  d)
 
psu
ls (H) + (1  ps) uls (M)
 
= 1  (1  ps) pc (100  d) .
The non-choice egalitarian donor’s objective function Vn (d) is given by the sum of the (ex
ante) expected utilities EUhrn and EU
ls
n , which using (4.6) can be written as:
Vn (d) = EU
hr
n + EU
ls
n = 2  (1  ps) [pc (d) + pc (100  d)] .
The non-choice egalitarian donor’s optimal choice of donation is given by
@
@d
Vn (d) =   (1  ps) [p0c (d)  p0c (100  d)] (4.7)
=   (1  ps) p0c [ 0 (d)   0 (100  d)] = 0.
The choice egalitarian donor assigns the (ex ante) expected utilities EUhrch and EU
ls
ch
6Note that we slightly abuse the notation and, similarly to Section 4.2.1.1, use EUhrn and EU
ls
n to denote
the (ex ante) expected utilities. The same comment applies to the notation for the choice and non-choice
egalitarian donors’ objective functions, as well as the corresponding constructs in the analysis of donations
under ambiguity.
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to patients hr and ls, respectively. It follows from our assumptions that
EUhrch = (1  pc (d)) uhr (H) + pc (d)
 
psu
hr (H) + (1  ps) uhr (M)
 
(4.8)
= 1  (1  ps) pc (d) = EUhrn ,
EU lsch = (1  pc (100  d)) uls (H) + pc (100  d)
 
psu
ls (H) + (1  ps) uls (M)
 
= 1  (1  ps) (1  pa) pc (100  d) > EU lsn .
The choice egalitarian donor’s objective function Vch (d) is given by the sum of the (ex ante)
expected utilities EUhrch and EU
ls
ch, which using (4.8) can be written as:
Vch (d) = EU
hr
ch + EU
ls
ch = 2  (1  ps) [pc (d) + (1  pa) pc (100  d)] .
Her optimal donation choice is given by
@
@d
Vch (d) =   (1  ps) [p0c (d)  (1  pa) p0c (100  d)] (4.9)
=   (1  ps) p0c [ 0 (d)  (1  pa)  0 (100  d)] = 0
Using (4.7) and (4.9) we obtain:
Proposition 2 Consider a society that consists of both choice egalitarian and non-choice
egalitarian donors. Suppose that each donor is given £100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both allocations are for research that improves prevention
of the disease. Then the average allocation to the hereditary cancer is larger than that for
the lifestyle-related cancer.
Propositions 1 and 2 also apply to the aggregate (across all potential donors) allo-
cations. That is, the aggregate allocation to the hereditary cancer under both scenarios
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(treatment and prevention) exceeds the aggregate allocation to the lifestyle-related cancer.
4.2.2 Donations under Ambiguity
4.2.2.1 Donations to Cancer Treatment
Similarly to Section 4.2.1.1, the survival rate for both cancer types is given by ps (d) =
p0s+(1  p0s)   (d) , where p0s has some unique value in the interval (0, 1) . In contrast to Section
4.2.1.1 where pa also had a unique value, the decision-maker’s beliefs about the likelihood
that cancer ls is induced by a specific, avoidable, lifestyle are given by the probability interval⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
, where 0  pa  p¯a  1. pa and p¯a are called minimal and maximal probabilities,
respectively. As before, the corresponding probability for cancer hr is assumed to be equal
to zero.
The elements of
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
can be thought of as representing at least two factors: the
decision-maker’s information on the possible probabilities and his or her degree of confidence
in the existing theories surrounding these probabilities.7 So, for example, if there are several
competing hypotheses about the likelihood that cancer ls is induced by a specific lifestyle,
but the donor is convinced that only one is truly valid, then
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
would be a singleton.
In this case, the decision-maker faces pure risk. In contrast, complete ambiguity or pure
uncertainty is characterized by
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
= [0, 1] . This represents situation where the donor
has no information on the current likelihood that cancer ls is induced by a specific lifestyle
other than that it falls somewhere in [0, 1]. We will call the di↵erence between the maximal
and minimal probabilities a degree of ambiguity and denote it by ! ⌘ p¯a   pa.
7Gajdos et al. (2004) provide a complementary interpretation of the set of probabilities. The decision-
maker in their model maximizes the minimum expected utility computed with respect to a subset of the
set of initially given priors. The extent to which the set of initially given priors is reduced is a measure of
aversion to information imprecision.
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The donor has ↵ MMEU preferences
Wi(d) = ↵ min
pa2[pa,p¯a]
 
EUhri + EU
ls
i (pa)
 
(4.10)
+ (1  ↵) max
pa2[pa,p¯a]
 
EUhri + EU
ls
i (pa)
 
,
where ↵ 2 [0, 1] is the parameter characterizing the donor’s attitude to ambiguity, i 2 {n, ch}
reflects whether the donor is a choice egalitarian or a non-choice egalitarian, and EUhri and
EU lsi (pa) are given by (4.2) for i = n and (4.4) for i = ch. ↵ MMEU preference structure is
a generalization of Arrow-Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz, 1952, Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972) and
it reduces to an expected utility preference functional when
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
is a singleton.
↵ MMEU preference structure is also a natural generalization of the maximin and
maximax decision rules (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). When ↵ = 1, ↵ MMEU preferences
have maximin expected utility form (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) which corresponds to com-
plete ambiguity aversion (also called complete pessimism) on the donor’s part. An MMEU
donor is completely pessimistic in the sense that, when evaluating stochastic outcomes, he or
she always uses the probability distribution that yields the lowest possible expected utility
over
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
. In our case, an MMEU donor will use the smallest possible probability pa that
cancer ls is induced by lifestyle.
In contrast, ↵ = 0 corresponds to a donor with maximax expected utility preferences
and reflects a situation where the donor is completely ambiguity tolerant. A donor with
↵ = 0 focuses all attention on the most optimistic probability distribution, which in our case
is equal to p¯a.
Given that ↵ MMEU utility is a weighted linear functional of the most pessimistic
and most optimistic scenarios, it is natural to call ↵ a measure of ambiguity aversion or a
coe cient of pessimism. A donor with a larger ↵ is said to be more ambiguity averse (or
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more pessimistic).8 A donor with ↵ > 0.5 is said to be ambiguity averse while a donor
with ↵ < 0.5 is said to be ambiguity loving. Note also that a donor with ↵ = 0.5 is not
ambiguity neutral. In the present model, a donor is ambiguity neutral if and only if the set
of probabilities
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
is a singleton.
The utilities assigned by the choice egalitarian and non-choice egalitarian donors to
the two cancer patients are identical to the corresponding utilities in Section 4.2.1.1. Under
this assumption and using (4.1), (4.2) and (4.10), we can write the non-choice egalitarian
donor’s objective function as
Wn(d) = ps (d) + ps (100  d) ,
while the choice egalitarian donor’s objective as
Wch(d) = ps (d) + ps (100  d) +
 
↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a
 
(1  ps (100  d)) .
The latter expression reveals that the choice-egalitarian donor with ↵ MMEU preference
and beliefs
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
behaves similarly to the choice-egalitarian donor with expected utility
preferences and beliefs given by the singleton probability
 
↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a
 
. It also follows
immediately from the objective functions above that the non-choice egalitarian donor’s op-
timal donation is unchanged from Section 4.2.1.1 and is given by (4.3). In contrast, the
condition characterizing the choice egalitarian donor’s optimal donation changes from (4.5)
to:  
1  p0s
  ⇥
 0 (d)   1   ↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a    0 (100  d)⇤ = 0. (4.11)
Using the expression for Wn(d) and (4.11), we obtain
8Note that “more ambiguity averse” is a comparative rather than absolute notion. Thus, a more ambiguity
averse donor may very well be ambiguity loving.
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Proposition 3 If the donor is non-choice egalitarian then her donation to the treatment of
the lifestyle-related cancer will be una↵ected by her ambiguity aversion and her beliefs
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
that cancer ls is lifestyle-related. Conversely, if the donor is choice egalitarian then
(a) a more ambiguity averse donor will donate more to the treatment of the lifestyle-related
cancer;
(b) an increase in the minimal likelihood of the lifestyle-related cancer, holding its degree of
ambiguity constant, dpa = dp¯a > 0 will result in a decrease in the donation to the treatment
of the lifestyle-related cancer.
(c) an increase in the ambiguity of the lifestyle-related cancer, holding its minimal likelihood
constant, dp¯a > 0 = dpa will result in a decrease in the donation to the treatment of the
lifestyle-related cancer.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be grasped immediately by examining the
expressions for the two donor types’ objective functions. While the attitude and perception
of ambiguity don’t a↵ect the non-choice egalitarian donor, these behavioral traits enter the
choice egalitarian donor’s objectiveWch(d) as the sum
 
↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a
 
of the minimal and
maximal probabilities weighted by the respective ambiguity attitudes. This term is decreas-
ing in the degree of ambiguity aversion and increasing in pa and p¯a. Recall also that the larger
the magnitude of
 
↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a
 
the larger the utility assigned by the choice egalitarian
to the adverse outcome uls (M) associated with the lifestyle-related cancer. As a result,
donations to the lifestyle related cancer become relatively unattractive as
 
↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a
 
increases.
4.2.2.2 Donations to Cancer Treatment
Similarly to Section 4.2.1.2, the cancer rate for both cancer types is given by pc (d) = p0c  (d) .
The utilities assigned by the choice egalitarian and non-choice egalitarian donors to the two
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cancer patients are also identical to the corresponding utilities in Section 4.2.1.2. The beliefs
about pa and attitudes to ambiguity are the same as in the preceding section. Also similarly
to Section 4.2.2.1, the donor has ↵ maximin expected utility preferences.
Under these assumptions, we can write the non-choice egalitarian donor’s objective
function as
Wn (d) = 2  (1  ps) [pc (d) + pc (100  d)] .
while the choice egalitarian donor’s objective as
Wch (d) = 2  (1  ps)
⇥
pc (d) +
 
1   ↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a   pc (100  d)⇤ .
The choice egalitarian donor’s optimal choice is given by
  (1  ps) p0c
⇥
 0 (d)   1   ↵pa + (1  ↵) p¯a    0 (100  d)⇤ = 0 (4.12)
Using the expression for Wn (d) and (4.12) we obtain:
Proposition 4 If the donor is non-choice egalitarian then her donation to the prevention of
the lifestyle-related cancer will be una↵ected by her ambiguity aversion and her beliefs
⇥
pa, p¯a
⇤
that cancer ls is lifestyle-related. Conversely, if the donor is choice egalitarian then
(a) a more ambiguity averse donor will donate more to the prevention of the lifestyle-related
cancer;
(b) an increase in the minimal likelihood of the lifestyle-related cancer, holding its degree of
ambiguity constant, dpa = dp¯a > 0 will result in a decrease in the donation to the prevention
of the lifestyle-related cancer.
(c) an increase in the ambiguity of the lifestyle-related cancer, holding its minimal likelihood
constant, dp¯a > 0 = dpa will result in a decrease in the donation to the prevention of the
lifestyle-related cancer.
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4.3 Survey Data
The study was conducted from November 24-28, 2014 using the online survey platform
Maximiles. A total of 166 valid responses were obtained out of a group of 203 respondents
recruited from the UK general population.9
To elicit how charitable giving is a↵ected by the individual responsibility of the ben-
eficiaries of hypothetical donations, the respondents faced a series of hypothetical choice
questions (see Appendix B). For two of the choice questions, the prevention and treatment
questions, the respondents were asked to allocate £100 between two alternatives. For the
first of these questions, the choice pertained to the allocation between research on the pre-
vention of hereditary versus lifestyle-related cancers, while for the second question, it was
between research on the treatment of hereditary versus lifestyle-related cancers. The third
choice question, coined the hazard question, asked the participants how they would allocate
some fixed amount of money between a smoker and non-smoker who both have been exposed
to a lung cancer hazard.
We chose the equal division between the alternatives as the default allocation for all
choice questions. The deviations of the respondents’ selections from this default are denoted
by yp, yt and yh for the prevention, treatment and hazard questions, respectively. In what
follows, we will call these variables as allocations relative to the default or, simply, relative
allocations. Positive values of these variables reflect preference for giving to hereditary
cancers in the case of variables yp and yt and to non-smokers in the case of variable yh.
The sample statistics for the three relative allocations are reported in Table 1. It reveals
that 66% of the respondents allocated a strictly larger share to the prevention of hereditary
9Catch trial questions preceded the main body of the survey to ensure that only data for the respondents
who paid su cient attention was retained. In some of the survey questions, the respondents were asked
to choose minimum and maximum values for a certain variable. If they ignored the instructions that “the
minimum should be less than the maximum”, they were removed from the sample (31 respondents). There
were also 6 respondents who failed to answer at least one of the choice questions.
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cancers while 12% strictly preferred the prevention of lifestyle-related cancers. The pattern
for the treatment question is very similar. For the hazard question, 67% of the respondents
strictly favored the non-smoker and only 3% strictly favored the smoker. The percentages
of the respondents who chose the equal split were 22% for the prevention question, 22% for
the treatment question, and 30% for the hazard question.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Choice Questions
(Based on 166 observations from Maximiles platform – November 24-28, 2014)
Task Mean Standard Median Share of Share of Share of
deviation subjects with subjects with subjects with
 50 6 yi< 0 yi= 0 0 < yi6 50
Overall
Prevention 16.26 22.92 17.00 12.05 21.69 66.27
Treatment 15.47 23.00 12.00 13.86 22.29 63.86
Hazard 17.02 18.42 16.00 3.01 30.12 66.87
Non-smokers
Prevention 17.35 23.51 20.00 12.50 16.91 70.59
Treatment 18.04 22.50 20.00 11.76 16.91 71.32
Hazard 19.68 18.76 20.00 2.21 23.53 74.26
Smokers
Prevention 11.33 19.59 0.00 10.00 43.33 46.67
Treatment 3.83 21.97 0.00 23.33 46.67 30.00
Hazard 4.97 10.40 0.00 6.67 60.00 33.33
We have also elicited information on several factors which may a↵ect the respondents’
answers to the choice questions and some additional questions of interest. First, we cate-
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gorized the respondents according to their awareness of two highly publicized cancer cases.
We asked the participants whether they have knowledge of Angelina Jolie’s decision to take
preventive actions against a hereditary cancer (variable AJ in Table 2) and Sean Connery’s
treatment for ailment which was likely to be a lifestyle-related cancer (variable SC in Table
2).
In 2013, Angelina Jolie, an actress, director, and humanitarian, revealed in a New
York Times article that she took a preventive double mastectomy10 after learning she had
an estimated 87% risk of developing breast cancer due to an inherited defective gene, BRCA1.
In her case, the chance of developing breast cancer dropped to under 5% after the surgery.
The share of the respondents who knew about this or similar cases was substantial (84%).
In 1993, it was revealed that Sean Connery, who is probably best known for his role
as James Bond, had received radiation therapy for undisclosed throat ailment. This news
sparked media reports that the actor was su↵ering from throat cancer following years of
heavy smoking (he started smoking when he was nine years old). The respondents who
knew about this or similar cases were not as many as in Angelina Jolie’s case (only 34%).11
The proportions of the respondents in our sample who had su↵ered from cancer or
had relatives who had cancer were 6.6% and 63.9%, respectively. The respondents’ self-
descriptions of lifestyles were recorded on a five-point scale (1 = very healthy to 5 = very
unhealthy). The average score for this variable was 2.6. We also categorized the participants
as smokers or non-smokers because we hypothesized that the respondents in these groups
might exhibit favoritism toward individuals from the same group, especially for the hazard
question. The proportion of smokers in our sample is 18.1%, which is very close to the
proportion of the wider UK population (HSCIC, 2015).
10Preventive double mastectomy is a prophylactic surgery of removing both breasts to reduce the risk of
breast cancer in women.
11Our choice of these two individuals was based on a pilot study that attempted to identify the well-known
cancer cases that involved celebrities.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the Independent Variables
(Based on 166 observations from Maximiles platform – November 24-28, 2014)
Variable Mean Std. Variable Mean Std.
dev. dev.
Group identity Likelihood perceptions
AJ 0.843 0.365 Personal ambiguity 0.241 0.221
SC 0.343 0.476 Personal hereditary minimum 0.214 0.197
Personal history 0.066 0.249 Personal hereditary ambiguity 0.195 0.189
Family history 0.639 0.482 Personal lifestyle-related minimum 0.231 0.184
Personal lifestyle 2.578 0.749 Personal lifestyle-related ambiguity 0.204 0.177
Smoke 0.181 0.386 Risk factor perceptions
Presenting order tasks first 0.560 0.498 Avoid RFs, benefit minimum 0.292 0.150
Likelihood perceptions Avoid RFs, benefit ambiguity 0.238 0.152
UK minimum 0.286 0.142 Socio-demographic data
UK ambiguity 0.278 0.179 Gender male 0.500 0.502
UK hereditary minimum 0.288 0.164 Age bands 3.620 1.504
UK hereditary ambiguity 0.218 0.142 Education level 4.723 1.831
UK lifestyle-related minimum 0.375 0.171 Household size (more than 1) 0.747 0.436
UK lifestyle-related ambiguity 0.247 0.166 Income level 2.018 0.937
Personal minimum 0.292 0.192 Have children 0.620 0.487
The survey also elicited the respondents’ perceived likelihoods of getting various can-
cers; the overall likelihood of getting cancer, the likelihood of getting hereditary cancer, and
the likelihood of getting lifestyle-related cancer. The respondents were asked to provide
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estimates of these likelihoods separately for the UK population as a whole and for them
individually. For each of these questions, the respondents could choose between intervals of
estimates and single estimates. The di↵erence between the maximal and minimal likelihoods
for each question, called as the degree of ambiguity, was used to measure a respondent’s per-
ceived ambiguity about the corresponding hazard. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics
for the minimum, which is equal to the minimal likelihood estimate, and degree of ambiguity
variables.12
We have also obtained estimates of the respondents’ cancer risk factor perceptions
(CRUK, 2011) which included the minimum and maximum benefits from avoiding risk fac-
tors. Finally, we collected information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the re-
spondents including their gender, age bands, education level, household size, income level
and number of children.
4.4 Results
We first examine the di↵erences across the respondents’ attitudes toward the role of benefi-
ciaries’ in a↵ecting the likelihood of a cancer. The results of both Wilcoxon sign-rank test
and t-test indicate that the relative allocations yp, yt and yh are all significantly di↵erent
from zero (p = 0.00 for both tests). The statistical tests also indicate that the respondents
prefer to contribute more to hereditary cancers (in the prevention and treatment questions)
and to non-smokers (in the hazard question).
Result 1. The decision-makers give more to causes with less individual responsibility.
12The subjects’ perceptions about the likelihoods of getting hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers for
the UK population are in line with the estimates of the corresponding likelihoods based on incidence data.
According to the CRUK (2017), the lifetime cancer risk is estimated 50% while the likelihood of a lifestyles-
related cancer is estimated at 42%. Both of these numbers fall in the corresponding intervals between the
minimum and maximum estimates provided by our subjects.
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This finding, combined with Propositions 1 and 2, suggests that a considerable share of
individuals favor choice egalitarianism (see, e.g., Konow 1996, 2000, Roemer, 1998, Cappelen
et al., 2013), which stipulates that only inequalities caused by di↵erences in personal choices
should remain following a redistribution policy. This result is consistent with a series of
laboratory experiments which address the issue of social preferences by eliciting experimental
subjects’ willingness to make transfers to subjects who have taken risks versus to those who
have not (see, e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007; Cappelen et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2013; and
Melkonyan et al., 2016).
The relative allocations in our survey don’t di↵er, however, across the prevention,
treatment, and hazard questions. All of the di↵erences are found to be statistically insignif-
icant (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests yield p = 0.27 for the comparison of the prevention and
treatment questions, p = 0.66 for the prevention and hazard questions, and p = 0.98 for the
treatment and hazard questions). This finding suggests that our respondents hold similar
fairness views for all three situations.
We also examined how the smoking status a↵ects the relative allocations. As one
may have expected, the non-smokers tend to give more to the alternatives with less indi-
vidual responsibility (p = 0.00 for Wilcoxon sign-rank test and t-test in all three choice
situations). Somewhat unexpectedly, the smokers tend to give more to hereditary cancers in
the prevention question and more to the nonsmokers in the hazard question (p = 0.01 and
0.02, respectively, for the Wilcoxon sign-rank test). The null hypothesis that the smokers
are indi↵erent between hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers, however, cannot be rejected
in the treatment question. Furthermore, we find that the smokers tend to give more to
lifestyle-related cancers in the treatment question than in the prevention question (p = 0.01
for the Wilcoxon sign-rank test). Finally, the Mann-Whitney test reveals that the smokers
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on average allocate less to causes with less individual responsibility (p = 0.07 for the preven-
tion question, 0.00 for the treatment question and 0.00 for the hazard question, respectively),
compared to the non-smokers. Such behavior is likely to be based on a belief that smokers
will benefit themselves or people in similar circumstances by allocating more to causes with
less individual responsibility. We summarize these findings in the following:
Result 2. The non-smokers allocated significantly more to causes with less individual respon-
sibility than the smokers. However, the smokers still allocated significantly more to hereditary
cancers than to lifestyle-related cancers in the prevention question and allocated significantly
more to the nonsmokers in the hazard question.
We now turn to exploring the e↵ects of other individual characteristics on the re-
spondents’ relative allocations. Note that the relative allocations belong to the interval
[ 50%, 50%] for each of the three choice questions. Since the relative allocations are cen-
sored at 50%, we used the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) in our estimation. We let y⇤i (i = p, t, h)
denote the unobserved latent variable which corresponds to the observed variable yi (Greene,
1997):
yi =
8>>>><>>>>:
 50 if y⇤i 6  50
y⇤i if   50 6 y⇤i 6 50
50 if y⇤i >  50
.
We separately estimated the following version of the Tobit model for each of the three
questions:13
y⇤i =  0 +C
0
i  +D
0
i  + "i, (4.13)
13Since the relative allocations were chosen contemporaneously, the disturbances in the estimated equations
for the three choice questions may be correlated. To investigate this possibility, the equations in (4.13) were
estimated simultaneously as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regression technique (Zellner, 1962).
The results were similar to the case of a separate estimation.
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whereCi is the vector of all continuous variables (likelihood perceptions and cancer awareness
variables, Table 2), andDi is the vector of all dummy variables and dummy coded categorical
variables (group identity and socio-demographic data, Table 2). In our estimation, we also
accounted for heteroskedasticity by using White’s (1980) estimator (see also Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010). The main regression results are reported in Table 3.14
The estimation of equation (4.13) yields a number of interesting findings. The respon-
dents’ awareness of highly publicized cancer cases had a statistically significant impact on
the corresponding relative allocations. The respondents who were aware of Angelina Jolie’s
or similar cases are estimated to invest 16.50% more in the treatment of a hereditary cancer.
Similarly, the respondents who were aware of Sean Connery’s or similar cases are estimated
to invest 6.98% more in the prevention of a lifestyle-related cancer. Thus, possessing infor-
mation of this nature positively a↵ects the corresponding donation irrespective of whether
the cancer in question is hereditary or lifestyle-related.
Result 3. Awareness of highly publicized or similar cases a↵ects the relative allocations in
favor of the publicized cancer type.
This finding is consistent with previous studies, where media coverage has been found
to be positively related to prosocial behaviour toward the reported issue (see, e.g., Simon,
1997; Brown and Minty, 2008). There are a number of potential drivers of this relationship.
Preferences over donations to di↵erent causes may depend on the information about these
causes. In our context, this information may pertain, for example, to the group a↵ected by
the disease and the urgency of the need (see, e.g., Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011).
Media coverage may also decrease the “social distance”15 between beneficiaries and
donors. The closer the social distance, the stronger the empathy. When a disease has been
14The multicollinearity is not a cause for concern since the variance inflation factors for all of our variables
are below 4.
15According to Loewenstein and Small (2007), social distance refers to “feelings of connection (or lack
thereof) between two individuals”.
82
covered by the media, subjects may feel connected with its (potential) victims. As a result,
these victims may become “identifiable” and no longer be perceived as simply unknown or
“statistical” lives (Schelling, 1968).
Our estimation results suggest that the respondents’ personal history does not a↵ect
the relative allocations. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the small proportion
of the respondents (6.6%) who reported relevant personal history.
In contrast to personal history, a much larger share of the participants in our survey
reported that one or more of their family members su↵ered from cancer (about 64%). It was
found that having a family history of cancer results in a statistically significant decrease of
9.28% in the allocation to hereditary cancers for the treatment question. The e↵ects of a
family history for the other two questions are statistically insignificant.
Our estimation results show that the relative allocations were a↵ected by the respon-
dents’ perceptions of own lifestyles. The less healthy the respondents’ self-described lifestyle,
the more she/he allocated to the smokers in the hazard question. Specifically, a 1 unit de-
crease in the self-reported healthiness of lifestyle, represented by a 1 unit increase in the
corresponding index, is estimated to lead to a statistically significant increase of £4.27 in
the amount allocated to the smokers.
As one could have also expected, the smoking status impacted the respondents’ rela-
tive allocations. Compared to the non-smokers in our sample, the smokers are estimated to
allocate £12.48 more to a lifestyle-related cancer in the treatment question and £11.97 more
to the smoker in the hazard question. Thus, the respondents exhibit “in-group favoritism”
(Sumner, 1906, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Rudman and Goodwin, 2004; Chen and Li, 2009)
conditional on both the smoking status and lifestyle.
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Table 3. Regression Results
Variable Prevention Treatment Hazard
Angelina Jolie’s case 10.62
(7.17)
16.50⇤⇤⇤
(6.14)
 0.51
(4.32)
Sean Connery’s case  6.98⇤
(4.21)
 5.26
(4.05)
 1.49
(2.97)
Personal history 2.58
(9.16)
 8.95
(7.04)
 6.86
(5.07)
Family history  6.11
(4.17)
 9.28⇤⇤
(3.80)
 4.16
(3.05)
Personal lifestyle 3.67
(3.16)
1.11
(2.51)
 4.27⇤⇤
(1.97)
Smoke  5.14
(4.43)
 12.48⇤⇤⇤
(4.67)
 11.97⇤⇤⇤
(3.76)
Presenting order tasks first 3.24
(4.08)
0.60
(3.80)
 9.21⇤⇤⇤
(2.78)
UK minimum  0.23
(0.21)
 0.16
(0.19)
 0.01
(0.16)
UK ambiguity 0.22
(0.15)
0.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.13)
0.07
(0.13)
UK hereditary minimum  0.05
(0.16)
 0.24
(0.15)
 0.03
(0.12)
UK hereditary ambiguity  0.24
(0.19)
 0.57⇤⇤⇤
(0.17)
 0.15
(0.17)
UK lifestyle-related minimum 0.28⇤⇤
(0.13)
0.35
(0.12)
⇤⇤⇤  0.02
(0.10)
UK lifestyle-related ambiguity 0.36⇤⇤
(0.15)
0.30⇤⇤
(0.15)
0.12
(0.10)
Personal minimum 0.17
(0.21)
0.08
(0.20)
 0.18
(0.18)
Personal ambiguity  0.04
(0.11)
 0.01
(0.10)
 0.05
(0.09)
Personal hereditary minimum 0.08
(0.18)
0.17
(0.17)
0.31⇤⇤⇤
(0.11)
Personal hereditary ambiguity 0.05
(0.12)
 0.02
(0.09)
0.07
(0.08)
Personal lifestyle-related minimum  0.47⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
 0.26
(0.17)
 0.12
(0.13)
Personal lifestyle-related ambiguity  0.05
(0.15)
 0.04
(0.13)
0.03
(0.11)
Avoid RFs, benefit minimum 0.18
(0.15)
0.03
(0.14)
0.17⇤
(0.10)
Avoid RFs, benefit ambiguity 0.03
(0.17)
0.19
(0.16)
 0.16
(0.14)
Gender male  8.06⇤
(4.23)
 5.13
(3.75)
0.57
(2.87)
Age bands 0.37
(1.39)
1.71
(1.31)
 0.17
(1.09)
Education level  0.86
(1.15)
 1.29
(1.07)
 0.11
(0.74)
Household size (more than 1)  0.47
(5.67)
2.31
(4.95)
0.67
(3.83)
Income level 3.17⇤
(1.85)
2.25
(1.78)
 0.29
(1.48)
Have children  6.04
(4.65)
 5.92
(4.53)
 1.53
(3.64)
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Result 4. The amount allocated to the smokers is larger for the decision-makers who reported
smoking compared to the non-smokers as well as for the decision-makers who reported a
relatively unhealthy lifestyle compared to those with a healthy lifestyle.
The relative allocations chosen by the respondents also vary with their perceptions
of various cancer risks at both the UK and individual levels. According to our estima-
tion results, a 1 unit increase in the perceived minimal likelihood (equivalent to 1% chance
of getting the disease) of a lifestyle-related cancer in the UK leads to £0.28 decrease in
the allocation to lifestyle-related cancers for the prevention question and £0.35 decrease
to lifestyle-related cancers for the treatment question. This result confirms the hypothesis
stemming from part (b) of Propositions 3 and 4 that an increase in the minimal probability
pa of the lifestyle-related cancer will lead to a decrease in donations to the cancer.
Result 5. The amount allocated to lifestyle-related cancers is decreasing in its perceived
minimal likelihood of a lifestyle-related cancer in the UK for both the prevention and treatment
questions.
Behavior is also sensitive to the respondents’ perceptions of ambiguity. To the best of
our knowledge, this channel has been overlooked in the existing literature and ours is the first
study to connect donation behavior with perceived ambiguity of cancer risk. A 1 percent
increase in the degree of ambiguity of hereditary cancer in the UK leads to £0.57 decrease
in the allocation to hereditary cancers in the prevention question; while a 1 percent increase
in the degree of ambiguity of lifestyle-related cancers in the UK leads to £0.36 decrease
in the allocation to lifestyle-related cancers in the prevention question and £0.30 decrease
in the treatment question. The result regarding the e↵ect of the degree of ambiguity of
lifestyle-related cancers is precisely what part (c) of Propositions 3 and 4 predicts.
Result 6. The decision-makers allocate more to cancers for which they perceive relatively
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small degree of ambiguity.
The relationship between the respondents’ perceptions of contracting cancer them-
selves and their allocations reveals that self-interest plays an important role in their choices.
A 1 percent increase in a respondent’s perceived minimal likelihood of contracting a lifestyle-
related cancer herself/himself leads to an estimated £0.47 increase in the allocation to
lifestyle-related cancers in the prevention question. In addition, a 1 percent increase in a
respondent’s perceived minimal likelihood of contracting a hereditary cancers herself/himself
themselves leads to an estimated £0.31 increase in the allocation to the non-smoker in the
hazard question.
Result 7. The decision-makers exhibit a certain degree of self-interest in their choices by
allocating more to cancers for which they perceive a larger minimal individual likelihood.
The subjects’ risk factor perceptions also a↵ect their choices. For a 1% increase in the
perceived minimum benefits from avoiding risk factors, the share allocated to hypothetical
smokers decreased by 0.17% in the hazard question.
None of the socio-demographic characteristics are statistically significant in a↵ecting
the relative allocations for the treatment and hazard questions while gender and income
are the only statistically significant e↵ects for the prevention question. It was estimated
that, compared to men, women donate £8.06 more to hereditary cancers in the prevention
question. This might be due to the fact that most known hereditary cancers (such as breast
and ovarian cancers caused by defective genes) occur only in women. As a result, women may
possess more information on hereditary cancers and perceive prevention in this category to be
more important. Alternatively, women may be more likely to exhibit choice egalitarianism.
We also found that decision-makers with more financial resources donate significantly more
to hereditary cancers in the prevention question; an estimated increase of £3.17 as a result
of an increase of £20, 000 in the income category.
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Result 8. Women and decision-makers in relatively high-income categories donate more to
hereditary cancers in the prevention question.
4.5 Conclusion
Views on individual responsibility are of great importance to numerous public debates on
healthcare policies. This study elicits such views from the general public by analysing what
they perceive to be just allocations between lifestyle-related and hereditary cancers. The
findings of this research are multidimensional. First, people take individual responsibility
into account. On average, our participants donate about twice as much to cancer with less
individual responsibility (hereditary cancers) than to cancer with more individual responsi-
bility (lifestyle-related cancers). This result is consistent with our results 1 and 2 in the next
chapter, which are based on a di↵erent data set. For clarity, Result 1 in the next chapter
indicates that, starting from the scenario where no information on individual responsibility is
provided in the project description, adding information on hereditary/lifestyle-related causes
of a cancer to the description has a positive/negative e↵ect on donation, while Result 2 indi-
cates that donors contribute more to cancers with smaller prevention rates. Taken together,
these results from the empirical parts of this thesis provide us consistent supporting evidence
to choice egalitarianism. The evidence is useful, not only because it resonates well with the
previous literature on fairness principles, but also because it extracts precious views from
the general public that may help construct a more equitable healthcare system or society.
Second, people exhibit “in-group favoritism” with regard to smoking status and self-
reported lifestyle. The amount allocated to the smokers is larger for the decision-makers
who reported smoking compared to the non-smokers as well as for the decision-makers who
reported a relatively unhealthy lifestyle compared to those with a healthy lifestyle. Since
in-group favoritism is revealed also in the next chapter, where women/men are found to favor
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to donate to women/men only cancer, our results from these two chapters are consistent on
this dimension.
Third, risk perceptions of various cancer likelihoods a↵ect peoples decisions. People
allocate more to cancers which they perceive to have a relatively low level of ambiguity and
a larger minimal individual likelihood of contracting. These results justify the importance
of studying risk perceptions and ambiguity. They may be an important dimension for future
research on fairness preferences. Lastly, apart from gender and income, social demographics
seem to have no e↵ect.
The intended contribution of this chapter (and next chapter) is to understand the
publics views of justice with regard to individual responsibility, which is an essential pre-
liminary step in constructing a more equitable healthcare system. A natural next step is to
reflect these views in healthcare policies, in which multiple concerns need to be balanced.
For instance, concerns for individual responsibility need to be balanced against other justice
concerns such as justice according to need; and justice concerns need to be balanced against
non-justice concerns such as e ciency. These issues are left for future research.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: First, consider the non-choice egalitarian donor. It follows from
her first-order condition (4.3) that
 0 (d) =  0 (100  d) .
By strict concavity of  ,  0 is strictly decreasing and hence
d = 100  d =) d = 50.
Thus, the optimal allocation for the non-choice egalitarian donor entails an equal split be-
tween the two cancer types.
Next consider the choice egalitarian donor. From her first-order condition (4.5), we
have
 0 (d) = (1  pa)  0 (100  d)
which, together with  0 > 0, implies that
 0 (d) <  0 (100  d) .
Since  0 is strictly decreasing, it then follows that
d > 100  d =) d > 50.
Thus, thve optimal allocation to the hereditary cancer is greater than 50.
89
Summarizing, the average allocation to the hereditary cancer is larger than that to
the lifestyle-related cancer. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2: First, consider the non-choice egalitarian donor. From her first-
order condition (4.7), we have
 0 (d) =  0 (100  d)
By strict convexity of  ,  0 is strictly increasing and hence
d = 100  d =) d = 50.
Next, consider the choice egalitarian donor. From her first-order condition (4.9), we
have
 0 (d) = (1  pa)  0 (100  d)
which implies (note that  0 < 0) that
 0 (d) >  0 (100  d) .
Since  0 is strictly increasing, the last inequality imlies
d > 100  d =) d > 50.
Summarizing, the average allocation to the hereditary cancer is larger than that for
the lifestyle-related cancer. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3: Di↵erentiating the left-hand-side of (4.11) with respect to ↵,
we obtain (1  p0s)
 
pa   p¯a
 
 0 (100  d) < 0. Part (a) then follows by the implicit function
theorem.
The marginal e↵ect of change dpa = dp¯a > 0 on the left-hand-side of (4.11) is given
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by (1  p0s)  0 (100  d) dpa > 0. Part (b) then follows by the implicit function theorem.
The marginal e↵ect of change dp¯a > 0 = dpa on the left-hand-side of (4.11) is given by
(1  p0s) (1  ↵)  0 (100  d) dp¯a > 0. Part (c) then follows by the implicit function theorem.
⌅
Proof of Proposition 4: Di↵erentiating the left-hand-side of (4.12) with respect to ↵, we
obtain (1  ps) p0c
 
p¯a   pa
 
 0 (100  d) < 0. Part (a) then follows by the implicit function
theorem.
The marginal e↵ect of change dpa = dp¯a > 0 on the left-hand-side of (4.12) is given
by   (1  ps) p0c 0 (100  d) dpa > 0. Part (b) then follows by the implicit function theorem.
The marginal e↵ect of change dp¯a > 0 = dpa on the left-hand-side of (4.12) is given
by   (1  ps) p0c (1  ↵)  0 (100  d) dp¯a > 0. Part (c) then follows by the implicit function
theorem. ⌅
———————————————————————————————————————–
4.6.2 Appendix B: Choice Questions
Question 1. Suppose that £100 would be donated on your behalf to research on cancer
treatment (such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy). Please indicate the percentage of this
amount that you would allocate to the treatment of hereditary cancers (caused by an inher-
ited genetic defect). The rest of the funds will go to the treatment of lifestyle-related cancers
(such as smoking, poor diet, and physical inactivity).
——————————————————————————————————————
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Question 2. Suppose that £100 would be donated on your behalf to research on cancer
prevention (such as genetic testing). Please indicate the percentage of this amount that
you would allocate to the prevention of hereditary cancers (caused by an inherited genetic
defect). The rest of the funds will go to the prevention of lifestyle-related cancers (such as
smoking, poor diet, and physical inactivity).
——————————————————————————————————————
Question 3. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that a segment of general population
has been exposed to a cancer hazard (for example, due to negligence by some third party).
After this incident, some proportion of the exposed population contracted lung cancer. In
response to this adverse outcome, the government allocated a fixed amount of funds to
compensate the individuals that were exposed to the hazard.
Consider the compensation scheme of the following two individuals; both were exposed
to the hazard and contracted the disease, while the first was a heavy smoker and the second
not. A fixed amount of money has been allocated to compensate these two individuals.
Please indicate the percentage of this amount that you would allocate to compensating the
smoker (the rest of the funds will go to the non-smoker):
——————————————————————————————————————
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Chapter 5
Justice in an Uncertain World:
Evidence on Donations to Cancer
Research
Abstract: The paper uses information on charitable contributions to cancer research in
the United Kingdom to elicit information on fairness principles endorsed by donors. The
latter face a choice between contributing to several hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers
and their choices of how much to donate to di↵erent cancers reveal how they view luck vis-
a-vis individual choices. We find that provision of information on lifestyle-related causes of
cancer adversely a↵ects contributions. In contrast, information on hereditary causes has a
positive e↵ect on donations. Thus, a non-negligible share of the donors lean toward choice
egalitarianism, which conditions outcomes on the potential beneficiaries’ choices, and this is
mainly due to preferences of women who tend to strongly favor choice egalitarianism.
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5.1 Introduction
What a society perceives as fair is at the center stage of public debates surrounding financial
bailouts of companies and countries, healthcare policies, and welfare programs. Under a
democratic system of governance, these perceptions and policies reflect attitudes of individ-
ual society members to di↵erent fairness principles. Hence, assessment of these individual
attitudes is of paramount importance for understanding the drivers of public policies. The
present study makes an important step in this direction by using data on charitable contri-
butions to cancer research in the United Kingdom.
In a non-deterministic world, fairness principles can be di↵erentiated according to
the degree to which individuals are held responsible for their choices vis-a-vis their luck.
At one end of this spectrum of fairness principles is strict egalitarianism (Nielsen, 1985),
which does not hold individuals responsible for any causes of inequality. According to the
principle, social redistribution should be based solely on outcomes. At the opposite end
of the spectrum is libertarianism (Nozick, 1974), which postulates that individuals should
bear full responsibility for their circumstance even if they are caused by bad luck. Some
theories of distributive justice combine egalitarian principles with concerns for individual
responsibility1. One of the most notable among these is choice egalitarianism (Dworkin,
1981a, 1981b; Arneson 1989, Cappelen et al., 2013) that holds people responsible for their
choices but not for their luck.
To understand which of these fairness principles people endorse, we use charitable
contributions to research on cancer treatment and prevention made via the online platform
recently developed by the Cancer Research United Kingdom (CRUK). The data collected
via the platform o↵ered a unique opportunity to distinguish the incentives to contribute to
1See, e.g., Rawls, 1971, Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b, Arneson 1989, Cohen, 1989, Sen, 1993, Roemer, 1998,
Fleurbaey, 2008.
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cancers where chance plays a central role, namely hereditary cancers, and cancers where indi-
vidual choices are more important, lifestyle-related cancers. The platform enables potential
donors to choose a cancer research project for sponsorship as well as provides them with full
flexibility over the donation amount. The list of available projects includes both hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers and this characteristic of research projects is explicitly stated
for several of them. Moreover, donors can easily access information regarding each cancer’s
prevention rate (this term stands for the probability that the cancer victim can avoid the
cancer in question by some choice).
To disentangle di↵erent incentives of donors in our field experiment we develop a
theoretical model of donation behavior for decision-makers who embrace one of di↵erent
fairness principles. Our theory yields a number of testable hypotheses which are examined
in the empirical part of the paper. The main theoretical result is that choice egalitarians’
donations decrease with prevention rates while non-choice egalitarians are insensitive to these
changes. Our empirical analysis, which is the first study to use naturally-occurring data to
elicit attitudes to di↵erent fairness principles, reveals that a non-negligible part of the donors,
especially women, in our data set are choice egalitarian. In a companion paper (Safra, Ma,
and Melkonyan, 2017), we found a similar pattern of preferences for data obtained from an
online survey where respondents faced a series of hypothetical choice questions and reported
various socio-demographic characteristics.
The considerations of fair treatment of risk taking play a central role in a number of
contexts. A notable illustration is o↵ered by the functioning of a wide range of healthcare
systems (Cappelen and Norheim, 2005). Two very recent examples are o↵ered by policy
changes in the operation of the National Health System (NHS) in the United Kingdom. In
2014, the NHS Blood and Transplant Service announced that it was changing its current
policy by allowing people with severe drink-related liver diseases to be considered for liver
transplants (The Guardian, 2014). Many questioned the appropriateness of this decision
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mentioning that individuals who are likely to have harmed their own health are not as
deserving of treatment. The other example involves a policy that is tilted in the reverse
direction. In 2016, hospital leaders in North Yorkshire, UK announced that overweight
patients and smokers will be prohibited from most standard hip and knee surgeries for up
to a year (The Telegraph, 2016).
Redistribution of income and wealth is another important area where individual re-
sponsibility for poor choices frequently has a key role. Diverse fairness views of how poor
choices should influence redistributive policies reverberated loudly during the recent finan-
cial crisis. Many individuals and interest groups vehemently objected to using government
resources to help the troubled financial institutions while others defended it on the basis
that the alternative was even worse. A group of prominent economists wrote to Congress
cautioning against a bailout of “particular investors and institutions whose choices proved
unwise”, with fairness being their primary concern (Wolfers, 2008).
The experimental evidence suggests that a considerable fraction of laboratory subjects
tend to accept inequalities reflecting di↵erences in choice (Konow, 2000; Frohlich et al., 2004;
Cappelen et al., 2007; Cappelen et al., 2010; Krawczyk, 2010; Cappelen et al., 2013). The
laboratory experiments provide important insights into possible behavior in real-life situa-
tions and guidance for theoretical developments. The potential for generalizability of these
predictions to a wide range of domains hinges upon a combination of theory and empirical
evidence from naturally occurring environments (Winkler and Murphy, 1973; Harrison and
List, 2004). We make one of the first steps in this direction in the context of understanding
individuals’ attitudes to di↵erent distributive justice principles. In addition to providing
a positive reconciliation of the findings regarding these attitudes from the laboratory and
naturally-occurring environments, we o↵er a number of additional insights about factors that
a↵ect charitable contributions. Thus, the paper also contributes to a burgeoning literature
on charitable giving (see, e.g., Auten et al., 2002; Landry et al., 2010) and provides guidance
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for structuring fund-raising activities.
In Section 5.2, we develop and analyze a novel model of charitable contributions that
yields a number of novel insights and testable hypotheses. In addition to the result mentioned
above, the model predicts that survival rates adversely a↵ect donations. In Section 5.3, we
develop the empirical model and report its results. In addition to the result mentioned
above, there are three main findings. First, a non-negligible share of the donors tends to
favor choice egalitarianism. Provision of information on hereditary causes of a cancer in a
project description has a positive e↵ect on donations. In contrast, information on lifestyle-
related causes negatively a↵ects contributions. We also find that at least a significant part
of the latter e↵ect is driven by women. Second, in line with our theoretical predictions,
contributions are larger for cancers with smaller survival rates. Third, there is “in-gender
favoritism” with each gender donating significantly more to cancers that a↵ect only their own
gender. The final section of the paper concludes and outlines avenues for future research.
5.2 Theoretical Model
We model a donor who decides how much to contribute to a cancer of certain type.2 The
donor possesses other-regarding preferences. She cares about her own utility, denoted by
UD, that is derived from her own income, and the utility of a representative cancer patient,
denoted by UP . Her preferences are represented by the function W
 
UD, UP
 
, which is
assumed to be strictly increasing in both arguments and concave with non-negative cross-
partial derivatives.3 For simplicity, we assume that her own utility UD displays risk neutrality
so that UD (x) = x for all income levels x. The donor’s initial income equals y and she
considers donating a non-zero part d of her income to research on a specific type of cancer,
2The comparative statics results in this section hold in a wide range of environments where donors choose
the cancer type toward which to direct their contributions. For space considerations, we do not model this
choice.
3Utilitarianism corresponds to the case of linear W.
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assuming her donation will have a positive e↵ect on the patient’s utility UP . More specifically,
she believes that her donation will increase the patient’s probability of survival. Let ps (d)
denote the probability of survival, or survival rate, for a patient diagnosed with this type of
cancer. It is defined as
ps (d) = p
0
s +
 
1  p0s
 
e (d) ,
where p0s 2 (0, 1) is the cancer’s current survival rate and e : R+ ! [0, 1] is a strictly
increasing and strictly concave function with e(0) = 0. The survival rate function represents
the donor’s beliefs that (1) her donation has a positive e↵ect on the survival rate and (2)
the size of the e↵ect is negatively related to the current survival rate. Note that for our
specification all values of ps (d) fall between p0s and 1.
It is assumed that surviving the cancer, an outcome denoted by H, yields the patient,
in the eyes of the donor, a utility of one unit. That is, UP (H) = 1. Dying from the cancer,
an outcome denoted by M , yields a lower utility. The level of utility under contingency
M depends on whether the donor takes into account the extent to which this cancer may
be induced by the patient’s lifestyle and on whether the donor’s preferences exhibit dissat-
isfaction with the patient for his cancer-inducing behavior. To model this possibility, let
pr 2 [0, 1) denote the probability that the cancer victim can avoid the cancer by modifying
his behavior, called the prevention rate. When pr = 0, the cancer victim could not have
avoided the cancer. In contrast, when pr is arbitrarily close to 1, the cancer patient could
have avoided the cancer with almost certainty.
The donor believes that an unhealthy lifestyle is a choice made by a supposedly
informed individual. A choice egalitarian donor acts upon this belief in the following sense.
She reasons that since the patient seems to care less about his own death by following an
unhealthy lifestyle, his utility di↵erence between being healthy and being dead is smaller
than that of patients who do not follow this kind of risky behavior. To reflect this trait of
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the donor’s preferences, we assume that UP (M) = pr for a choice egalitarian donor. Hence,
the utility di↵erence between the two health outcomes under this assumption is given by
UP (H)   UP (M) = 1   pr, which is decreasing with the prevention rate. If the donor is
not a choice egalitarian (that is, either a strict egalitarian or a libertarian), then she uses
UP (M) = 0.4
In addition to the egalitarian dimension, the fairness principles may be di↵erentiated
depending on whether a principle of fairness is applied ex ante or ex post. At one end of this
spectrum is the idea that a principle of fairness should be applied ex ante – to the expected
utilities of the individuals involved (Diamond, 1967; Weymark, 1991; Epstein and Segal,
1992; Mongin, 2001; Karni and Safra, 2002; and Grant et al., 2010). At the other end is
the idea that a principle should be applied ex post – to the final outcome allocations (Harel
et al., 2005; Adler and Sanchirico, 2006; Fleurbaey, 2010; and Grant et al., 2012a). These
two principles coincide when society adopts utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1977b). However, as
most fairness notions involve some degree of non-linearity, the two principles usually lead to
di↵erent social distributions.
For the problem considered in our paper, the donor follows an ex ante principle if
the expected utility of the patient is integrated as an argument into the function W. She
follows an ex post principle if the values of W for all possible final outcomes are computed
before taking expectations. When W is not linear, the two principles and the corresponding
donation behavior di↵er. As will become clear below, our data does not allow to di↵erentiate
between the ex ante and ex post principles. The reason for considering those two extremes
is to show that the testable predictions of our theoretical model are robust to these two
formulations of the fairness principle.
Depending on their fairness views, there are two possible types of ex ante donors;
4Note that although libertarians are opposed to compulsory donations, they are not advocating against
voluntary ones.
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choice egalitarian and non-choice egalitarian donors. A choice egalitarian ex ante donor’s
objective function is given by
V xach (d) = W
 
UD (d) , EUP (d)
 
= W
 
y   d, ps (d)UP (H) + (1  ps (d))UP (M)
 
= W (y   d, ps (d) + (1  ps (d)) pr) ,
where EUP (d) is the patient’s expected utility. A non-choice egalitarian ex ante donor’s
objective is given by
V xanc (d) = W
 
UD (d) , EUP (d)
 
= W
 
y   d, ps (d)UP (H) + (1  ps (d))UP (M)
 
= W (y   d, ps (d)) ,
which was derived from V xach (d) by setting pr equal to 0.
Similarly, there are two possible types of ex post donors. A choice egalitarian ex post
donor’s objective is
V xpch (d) = ps (d)W
 
y   d, UP (H) + (1  ps (d))W  y   d, UP (M) 
= ps (d)W (y   d, 1) + (1  ps (d))W (y   d, pr) ,
while for a non choice egalitarian ex post donor it is given by
V xpnc (d) = ps (d)W
 
y   d, UP (H) + (1  ps (d))W  y   d, UP (M) 
= ps (d)W (y   d, 1) + (1  ps (d))W (y   d, 0) ,
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which was derived from V xpch (d) by setting pr equal to 0.
In Appendix, we prove the following two propositions about how di↵erent variables
a↵ect behavior of these four types of donors.
Proposition 1
(i) Both ex ante and ex post choice egalitarian donors donate smaller amounts to cancers
with higher prevention rates.
(ii) Donations of all non-choice egalitarian donors are una↵ected by prevention rates.
The higher the prevention rate the smaller the di↵erence between the recipient’s utility
of the positive outcome H and his utility of the adverse outcome M . Because a choice
egalitarian donor’s optimal donation is increasing in this di↵erence of utilities of di↵erent
outcomes, she donates less to cancers for which lifestyle has a relatively large role. Non-
choice egalitarian donors don’t di↵erentiate between the prevention rates in their assessment
of the adverse outcome, which immediately implies part (ii) of Proposition 1. Note also that
Proposition 1 applies both to ex ante and to ex post preferences. Thus, our findings are
robust against variations in the donor’s fairness views along this dimension.
Proposition 2 All donors donate smaller amounts to cancer types with higher current
survival rates.
For all four types of donors, donations are more e↵ective in changing the survival rate
when the current survival rate is relatively small. As a result, all donor types contribute rela-
tively more to cancers with relatively dire prognoses. In the following section, we empirically
test these and other theoretical predictions.
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5.3 Empirical Analysis
5.3.1 Data
Our analysis utilizes a data set that is based on a newly developed online donation platform
“My Project” (CRUK, 2015a). The platform is operated by CRUK, which is the world’s
largest independent cancer research charity. “My Project” presents potential donors with a
multi-layer system to choose a project for a donation and its amount. As showed in Figure
1, this system contains four stages. In the first stage, when a potential donor enters the
website, she is presented with 24 di↵erent categories, including almost all cancer types (20
categories) and some general cancer-related activities and services (4 types).5 After one of
these 24 categories is selected, in the second stage the potential donor can review all of the
available projects under the chosen category.
Each project is accompanied by a description, which is presented in the third stage
after the selection of a specific project. CRUK (2015a) contains full details of all projects
that are currently available for sponsorship or were recently closed. To give a taste of such
projects, here is an excerpt from the description of an actual project: “this project aims
to understand how breast cancer establishes its nutrient supply and how these supply lines
could be shut down to control breast cancer growth.” (CRUK, 2015b).
If the potential donor decides to donate to a project she then chooses the amount of
donation. She can also leave comments which are then made publicly available. This is the
last stage. The platform records the donation time, name of donor, chosen project, amount
of donation and comments (if any).
One of the main novelties of the donation platform is the donors’ full control over
the destinations of their contributions. This is in stark contrast to the standard way of
5These four are “basic cancer biology research”, “cancer nurses”, “clinical trials” and “general research”.
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allocating donations within charities, where “directed service” is only available to very large
donors6 and donations from the rest of donors are allocated by charities on a need basis.
The platform provides a unique opportunity to test the responsiveness of contributions to
various aspects of sponsored projects.
Figure 1. Donation Process on the Platform
Our data covers the period from April 1, 2014 to May 11, 2015.7 Given our research
objectives, we cannot use some of the data. Since the donors’ preferences over beneficiaries’
individual responsibility in causing a cancer can be estimated only for specific cancer types,
data for donations to four cancer categories on the platform (women’s, men’s, child and
rare cancers) and four cancer-related services are removed from the sample. We have also
combined the categories for the cervical and womb cancers and sarcomas into “cervical/womb
6Charities may have di↵erent interpretations for what a “very large” donation is. Irrespective of the
interpretation, “directed service” is in general not available to everyone. We are grateful to David Milton,
the head of the fundraising team from Worldwide Cancer Research, for clarifying these and many other
specifics of charitable giving to cancer.
7This is all of the data that was made available to us by the CRUK. The estimation results are very
similar for the data set that covers exactly one year.
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cancer”8 category since a number of projects under these categories are cross-listed. The
rest of the categories are left intact. The resulting sample contains 4, 879 donations to 13
categories and 32 projects.9 Table 1 contains a summary of di↵erent categories, the number
of donors for each category, and sample statistics for these donations.
Table 1 reveals that the average donation in our sample was £112 while the total
amount of donations was £547, 393. Among distinct cancer types, breast cancer attracted
the most aggregate donation. This is a consequence of a relatively large number of donors
who make contributions to breast cancer (a total of 1, 334 donors) and in spite of the fact that
the average donation to breast cancer is relatively small (an average of £65, which is only
slightly larger than the lowest average donation of £62 to stomach cancer). The top three
average donations were to cervical/womb cancer (£239), skin cancer (£235) and bone cancer
(£208), respectively. The standard deviations for these donations are also considerably large
(at 532, 1, 115 and 769, respectively).
8There was only one sarcoma project and it fell into both cervical and womb categories. The numbers of
the newly diagnosed cases are used as the weights in the aggregation of di↵erent categories (see the second
footnote following Table 3 for details).
9Out of a total of 32 projects on the platform, 23 mentioned cancer treatment only and 9 mentioned both
treatment and prevention.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Donations by Cancer Type†
(Based on “My Project” platform – April 1, 2014 to May 11, 2015)
Cancer Type Number Total Mean Standard Median
of donors donation deviation
Bone 111 23, 111 208 769 50
Bowel 282 43, 901 156 558 38
Brain 584 62, 879 108 354 30
Breast 1, 334 86, 807 65 367 25
Lung 381 47, 489 125 268 30
Lymphoma‡ 88 8, 033 91 167 38
Oesophageal 587 51, 863 88 538 25
Ovarian 197 16, 133 82 199 25
Pancreatic 447 70, 756 158 829 31
Prostate 315 26, 046 83 223 25
Skin 227 53, 293 235 1, 115 38
Stomach 118 7, 349 62 150 25
Cervical/Womb 208 49, 732 239 532 50
Total 4, 879 547, 393 112 514 25
† UK taxpayers can add a 25% gift to their donation at no additional cost, since CRUK claims this additional
amount from the UK’s tax and customs authority. This amount is included in the reported data.
‡ Lymphoma refers to non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
The summary statistics for the variables in our data set are reported in Table 2.
We classified the projects in the dataset based on the information about hereditary and
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lifestyle-induced causes provided in the projects’ descriptions (description in Table 2). Since
none of the project descriptions mentions both hereditary and lifestyle-induced causes, three
categories were created: (i) only hereditary causes are mentioned, (ii) only lifestyle-induced
causes are mentioned, and (iii) neither hereditary nor lifestyle-induced causes are mentioned.
Two projects, one for lung cancer and one for skin cancer, mention lifestyle-induced causes
in their descriptions. There are also two projects that mention hereditary causes. One of
these is for breast cancer while the other is for ovarian cancer.
At first glance, the statistics in Table 2 may suggest that including information about
lifestyle-induced causes attracts higher donations than mentioning hereditary causes or not
providing any information. However, such conclusions might be erroneous since they don’t
reflect all of the information about donation incentives. As the estimation results based on a
model that controls for cancer type and other available information demonstrate, the opposite
holds - mentioning hereditary causes has a positive e↵ect on donations while providing
information about lifestyle-related causes has the reverse e↵ect.
The comments left by the donors provide insights into the rationale behind dona-
tions.10 We have found four main events/factors associated with donations: attendance of
a fund-raising event (variable attend in Table 2), loss of a family member or a friend (loss),
donation as a gift to another person (gift)11, and fighting with a cancer (fight). The last
refers to the scenarios where the donor herself, a relative, or a friend are fighting with a
cancer. About 66% of the donors in our sample left comments. Among those who provided
comments, most (55%) mention attendance of a fund-raising event. The shares of donors
who mention loss of a family member or a friend, current fight with the disease and donation
as a gift are given by 23%, 10% and 3%, respectively.
10The coding of the comments was independently performed by two researchers. The results were then
compared to each other.
11An example of a donation in this category is a Christmas gift from person A to person B that specifies
that a specific contribution to the charity will be made in the name of person B.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
(Based on “My Project” platform – April 1, 2014 to May 11, 2015)
Variable Number Total Mean Standard Median
of donors donation deviation
Description
Hereditary 235 18, 507 79 184 26
Lifestyle-induced 454 75, 402 166 792 31
Neither 4, 190 453, 483 108 488 25
Comment †
Attend 1, 763 192, 194 109 421 25
Loss 735 155, 693 212 817 50
Fighting 312 47, 020 151 748 38
Gift 95 9, 474 100 152 50
Others‡ 2, 232 201, 763 90 474 25
Gender
Female 2, 541 250, 545 99 412 25
Male 1, 637 193, 937 118 591 31
Unisex 701 102, 911 147 639 30
Donor Type
Institution 80 50, 836 635 1, 738 181
Non-institution 4, 799 496, 557 103 463 25
Total 4, 879 547, 393 112 514 25
† The number of donors who left comments is 3,222. Among these donors, 2,647 attributed their donations
to one or more of the four categories of comments we have created.
‡ “Others” represents donors who either left no comments (1,657 donors) or ascribed their donations to
factors other than those captured by the four categories of the comments (575 donors).
We used the donors’ names to identify their gender and whether the donor is an
institution such as a company or a non-profit organization.12 Although men’s donations are
12There are three categories for gender - male, female, and unisex. The latter encompasses three groups
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on average 20% higher than women’s, the number of women donors is substantially higher
than the number of men13 and the latter e↵ect is so strong that the total amount of donations
by women exceeds that by men. This pattern across the two genders is in line with other
studies of charitable giving in the UK (see, e.g., CAF, 2015). Finally, and not surprisingly,
the institutional donors contributed considerably more than the non-institutional donors.
The share of the institutional donors is only 1.6%, but they account for 9.3% of the overall
donations.
To understand donation behavior driven by the degree a cancer could be prevented
by taking precautionary actions, we use data (CRUK, 2016a) on the prevention rate for each
cancer category in our dataset. This information is easily accessible on the donation platform.
According to CRUK (2016a), the prevention rate estimates the fraction of cancers that can
be attributed to “modifiable lifestyle” and “other theoretically avoidable factors” (see also
Parkin et al., 2011). The prevention rate variable is used as a proxy for the individual
responsibility in preventing a cancer.
The ten-year survival rate in the UK for people with di↵erent types of cancer is used
as a proxy for the probability of survival discussed in the theoretical part of the paper. We
have used the estimated ten-year survival rate for patients diagnosed during 2010-2011. This
was the most recent year for which data was available from the CRUK’s website in May 2016
(CRUK, 2016b). The prevention and ten-year survival rates are reported in Table 3. Given
ample evidence that donations vary with the time of the year (see, e.g., Eckel, Grossman
and Milano, 2007; Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013), we also control for the month the donation
was made.
of donors: donors with names that could belong to a man or a woman, couple-donors, and instutitions.
The procedure of coding the names was also independently performed by two researchers. Similarly to the
outcome for coding of the comments, the comparison revealed almost identical results.
13The ratio of the numbers of male to female donors in our sample is 0.64. This number is considerably
smaller than the ratio of the two genders (0.98) in the UK population.
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Table 3. Prevention and Ten-Year Survival Rates
by Cancer Type†,‡
Cancer Type Prevention Rate Ten-Year
Survival Rate
Bone 0.5 33
Bowel 54 57
Brain 0.5 13
Breast 27 78
Lung 89 5
Lymphoma 6 63
Oesophageal 89 12
Ovarian 21 35
Pancreatic 37 1
Prostate 0 84
Cervical/Womb‡ 54 73
Skin 86 89
Stomach 75 15
† Given that CRUK (2015b) specifies the prevention rates to be “less than 0.5%” for bone and brain cancer,
we have set them to 0.5%.
‡ The prevention rate for cervical/womb category is calculated as (3,064·100%+8,475·37%)/(3,064+8,475)=54%
while the ten-year survival rate as (3,064·63%+8,475·77%)/(3,064+8,475)=73%, where 3,064 is the number
of cervical cancers diagnosed in 2011 while 8,475 is the number of the newly diagnosed cases of womb cancer
for the same year. Note that 2011 was the most recent year for which data was available on CRUK’s web
site in May 2015 (CRUK, 2015c).
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5.3.2 Empirical Model of Donation Behavior and Its Findings
We estimate the following linear lognormal model:14
lnYi =  0 +  1Ri +  2Si +D
0
i  +C
0
i  + "i, (5.1)
where Yi is the amount of a donor’s contribution, Ri is the prevention rate, Si is the ten-
year survival rate, Di is the vector of all dummy variables (attend, loss, fighting, gift, and
institution), and Ci is the vector of all categorical variables (gender, cancer type, month,
and description). Since heteroskedasticity is still present after taking the logarithmic trans-
formation (Breusch-Pagan/CookWeisberg test, p = 0.00), White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimator is used in all specifications of the empirical model.
The main estimation results are reported in Table 4. We compare four specifications, A
through D, which are di↵erentiated by inclusion of dummy variables for the donation month
and selected cancer type.15 Specification A does not control for either factor. Specifications
B and C add controls for only one of these factors. Finally, specification D includes both
month and cancer type controls.
According to the estimation results, each of these sets of dummy variables is statisti-
cally significant (robust Wald test, p = 0.00 for both sets). The coe cients of determination
R2 for these specifications indicate that the model with both sets of dummy variables (spec-
ification D) provides a better fit of the data than the other specifications. The signs of
the coe cient estimates are consistent across all specifications, with the exception of the
coe cient for the dummy variable that characterizes mentioning lifestyle-induced causes of
a cancer in the project’s description. A comparison of specifications A   D also highlights
14A logarithmic transformation of the donation amount reduces the skewness of the distribution from
17.00 to 0.87 and the kurtosis from 358.57 to 4.47.
15Our choice of these two sets of dummy variables to form specifications A   D is predicated about the
large number of elements in each set.
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why controlling for cancer type and other relevant information may reverse the e↵ects of in-
formation about lifestyle-induced and hereditary causes of a cancer that are based solely on
summary statistics in Table 2 (see also the preceding section). Given the estimation results
of specifications A D, in what follows we focus on specification D.
Table 4. Regression Results
Specification
Variable A B C D
Prevention Rate  0.001
(0.001)
 0.000
(0.001)
 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
Ten-Year Survival Rate  0.001⇤⇤
(0.001)
 0.000
(0.001)
 0.213⇤⇤⇤
(0.039)
 0.216⇤⇤⇤
(0.038)
Attend 0.138⇤⇤⇤
(0.036)
0.147⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
0.138⇤⇤⇤
(0.036)
0.147⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
Loss 0.740⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
0.744⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
0.724⇤⇤⇤
(0.055)
0.733⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
Fighting 0.344⇤⇤⇤
(0.076)
0.348⇤⇤⇤
(0.075)
0.347⇤⇤⇤
(0.077)
0.352⇤⇤⇤
(0.077)
Gift 0.332⇤⇤⇤
(0.119)
0.283⇤⇤
(0.120)
0.287⇤⇤
(0.122)
0.240⇤
(0.123)
Institution 1.829⇤⇤⇤
(0.176)
1.796⇤⇤⇤
(0.176)
1.728⇤⇤⇤
(0.175)
1.705⇤⇤⇤
(0.175)
Gender: Unisex 0.025
(0.052)
0.034
(0.052)
0.092⇤
(0.051)
0.097⇤
(0.051)
Gender: Male 0.200⇤⇤⇤
(0.038)
0.196⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
0.246⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
0.240⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
Description: Hereditary 0.025
(0.077)
0.019
(0.076)
0.206⇤⇤⇤
(0.080)
0.184⇤⇤
(0.078)
Description: Lifestyle-induced 0.205⇤⇤⇤
(0.072)
0.151⇤⇤
(0.074)
 0.230⇤
(0.129)
 0.247⇤
(0.129)
Month e↵ects (11)   X   X
Cancer type (12)     X X
R2 0.085 0.109 0.130 0.150
Note. All specifications are based on the whole sample. Robust standard errors (White 1980) are reported
in parentheses. *,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
We follow Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981) by transforming the
estimated coe cients from (5.1) into what Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) call relative
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e↵ects and what we call estimated e↵ects. For continuous variables Ri and Si, the estimated
e↵ects are calculated as 100 · b i, where b i is the estimate of  i in (5.1). For the dummy
variables in Di, the estimated e↵ects are calculated as exp( bDi  12 bV ( bDi)) 1, where bDi is the
estimate of Di and bV ( bDi) is the estimate of the variance of bDi. The categorical variables in
Ci are dummy-coded. For this reason, their estimated e↵ects are calculated similar to those
for the dummy variables. In what follows, unless stated otherwise, we report the estimated
e↵ects based on specification D in Table 4.
We begin with the results on the relationship between the individual responsibility
variables and contributions. Potential donors have access to two types of information about
the role of individual responsibility for di↵erent cancers. The first type of information is
related to the statements about hereditary and lifestyle-induced causes in the project de-
scriptions. The second type pertains to the prevention rates for di↵erent cancers.
If donors are choice egalitarians and take this information into account, then, accord-
ing to Proposition 1, they will express their likes and dislikes via their donations. We find
that this indeed is the case for both types of information (see Results 1 and 2).
The variables that characterize the information on individual responsibility in the
project descriptions have a jointly significant e↵ect on donations (robust Wald test, p = 0.01).
Each of these variables is also statistically significant individually.
Result 1. (a) Starting from the scenario where no information on individual responsibility
is provided in the project description, adding information on hereditary causes of a cancer
to the description has a positive e↵ect on donations;
(b) Starting from the scenario where no information on individual responsibility is provided
in the project description, adding information on lifestyle-induced causes of a cancer to the
description has a negative e↵ect on donations.
Based on our estimation results, supplying information on the hereditary causes of
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a cancer in the project description results in a 18.4% increase in the donation; in contrast,
mentioning lifestyle-induced causes in the project description leads to a 24.7% decrease in
the donation (see Table 4). Result 1 has immediate implications for the design of fund-
raising activities by charities. If their objective is to maximize the amount of charitable
contributions, they may want to include information on hereditary causes and to exclude
information on lifestyle-induced causes from the project descriptions. We also find:
Result 2. Donors contribute more to cancers with smaller prevention rates.
According to our estimation results, an increase of 1 unit in the prevention rate (which,
in this case, is equal to 1%) leads to a 5.2% decrease in the amount of donation (see Table 4).
Thus, both types of information about individual responsibility have a significant impact on
donations. This finding is consistent with Proposition 1 of our theoretical model. Proposition
1 and Results 1 and 2 also suggest that a non-negligible share of the donors in our data set
are choice egalitarian.
From Proposition 2, donations are positively a↵ected by the severity of a cancer,
measured by the survival rate. Our empirical model supports this finding:
Result 3. Donors contribute more to cancers with a lower ten-year survival rate.
The estimated e↵ect is considerable. An increase of 1 unit in the ten-year survival
rate (which is equal to 1%) leads to a 21.6% decrease in the amount of donation. Note that
the e↵ect of a change in the survival rate on donations (21.6%) is around four times the
e↵ect of a change in the prevention rate (5.2%).
We now turn to the e↵ects of other variables on donations. Our estimates indicate
that, ceteris paribus, men are expected to donate 24.0% more than women (Table 4). Recall,
however, that the overall donation of women exceeds that of men since the number of women
donors is 55.2% higher than the number of men (Table 2).
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It is informative to juxtapose our findings to the existing estimates of the generosity
of the two genders.16 Similar to our results, a number of studies report that women are
more likely to donate than men (see, e.g., Andreoni et al., 2003; Piper and Schnepf, 2008).17
The evidence on the e↵ect of gender on the amount of donations is more mixed. Although
many studies find that men give higher amounts (Lyons and Passey, 2005; De Wit and
Bekkers, 2015), some find higher contributions by women (Chang, 2005). The di↵erence in
the contributions depends significantly on the type of charity under consideration (Andreoni
et al., 2003; Eckel et al., 2005). For example, men favor sports and recreation charities while
women prefer health and human services and many other charity types (see, e.g., Andreoni
et al., 2003 and Piper and Schnepf, 2008).
Wiepking and Bekkers (2012) argue that “the more socioeconomic variables, such as
age, income and educational level, that are included in the models examining charitable
giving, the smaller the reported gender di↵erences in giving are.” Since our data set doesn’t
contain information on income and wealth levels of the donors, a part of the estimated gender
di↵erence in donations may be due to higher levels of these two economic variables for men.
In addition to examining the relationship between gender di↵erences and amounts
of donations, we investigated how gender a↵ects the destinations of donations. We found
a significant statistical relationship ( 2(12) = 138, p = 0.00) by testing the hypothesis of
independence between gender and cancer type (see, e.g., Agresti 2013). Figure 2 depicts the
empirical distributions of female and male donors for each cancer category. For two out of
three “women only” cancer categories (breast cancer and womb/cervical cancer), the number
of women as a percentage of all women donors substantially exceeds the corresponding figure
for men. However, for ovarian cancer the percentage for men slightly exceeds the percentage
16For surveys of gender di↵erences in behavior and preferences, see, e.g. Croson and Gneezy (2009) and
Wiepking and Bekkers (2012).
17However, there are exceptions, albeit very few. For a survey that used a variation of the dictator game,
Bekkers (2007) finds that men are more likely to give to health charities than women.
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for women (see Figure 2). Similar to women, men tend to favor own gender. For prostate
cancer, which is the only “men only” cancer category in our data set, the number of men as
a percentage of all men donors substantially exceeds the corresponding figure for women.18
There are a number of explanations for such behavior. First, self-interested individuals
may be concerned that in the future they may get cancers a↵ecting own gender. As a
result of this purely selfish motive, they will contribute more to research on these cancers.
Second, “in-group favoritism” (Sumner, 1906, Rudman and Goodwin, 2004; Chen and Li,
2009) for gender may be a result of preference for individuals of own group. The third
potential explanation for “in-gender favoritism” is that donors have superior information
about cancers that a↵ect own gender and, as a result, contribute more to those cancers. The
18The pattern is similar when one compares “men’s cancer” and “women’s cancer” categories which were
removed from our data set. For men’s cancer, there are 32.9% female donors and 48.6% male donors; while
for women’s cancer, there are 56.7% female donors and 21.7% male donors. When the gender variable is
interacted with the cancer types variable, we however have no evidence on males contribute more in amount
than females to cancer types which have a high incidence on males or females contribute more in amount
than males to cancer types which have a high incidence on females.
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existing literature on in-group favoritism in charitable giving links donations to the diversity
of communities in terms of ethnicity, religion, income, and other characteristics (see, e.g.,
Andreoni et al., 2011). According to our knowledge, there are no studies that explore “in-
gender favoritism” in charitable giving. Thus, the present paper is the first attempt to tackle
this important phenomenon.
We now turn to the donors’ comments.19 First, the estimation reveals that donations
by individuals who mention a loss of a family member or a friend are greater by 73.3% than
those of others in our sample (Table 4). This is consonant with the existing empirical results
that personal experience promotes donations by increasing donors’ awareness of the needs
of a victim group (Burgoyne, Young and Walker, 2005; Bekkers, 2008) and reducing the
social distance20 between the donor and victims (Small and Simonsohn, 2008).21 Second,
the donors who state fighting a cancer donate 35.2% more (Table 4).
The other two factors also have a significant positive e↵ect on donations. Those who
attend a fund-raising event are estimated to donate 14.7% more (Table 4). Those who donate
as a gift give 24.0% more than others (Table 4). Brown and Ferris (2007) and Wiepking
and Maas (2009) also find a positive relationship between social networking and amount of
donations.
Figure 3 depicts the estimated e↵ects of di↵erent months for the whole sample and
for male-only and female-only groups. January is used as a baseline. The largest estimated
e↵ect is for January which is followed by a steady decrease in the e↵ects until May. The
estimated e↵ects fluctuate in the following months with the bottom reached in August. For
the whole sample, the estimated e↵ect for August is only 47.8% of that for January. This
19Due to lack of statistical significance we have excluded the dummy variable which characterizes whether
a comment was provided.
20Social distance refers to “feelings of connection (or lack thereof) between two individuals” (Loewenstein
and Small, 2007).
21However, some studies find no evidence that experience of illness matters for decisions whether or not
and how much to give (e.g., Smith, Kehoe and Cremer, 1995).
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pattern is most likely attributable to the structure of the UK tax system where the deadlines
for filing the tax returns are on January 31 and July 31 (see, e.g., Romney-Alexander, 2002).
Donations in the UK are normally made through the Gift Aid system, which allows both
matching and rebates from HM Revenue and Customs (Scharf and Smith, 2015). Tax relief
can only be claimed at the January deadline. This may explain why the estimated donations
are higher in January than in July, even though both are tax payment months.
We now conduct a closer examination of the di↵erences among di↵erent groups of
donors. Specifications E and F in Table 5 correspond to the estimation for female-only
and male-only groups, respectively. A comparison of the estimation results for these two
specifications reveals that the variables that proxy the individual responsibility have a sta-
tistically significant e↵ect only for women. Mentioning lifestyle-induced causes of a cancer
causes women to decrease their donations by 48.0% while a 1 percent increase in the preven-
tion rate leads to a 5.7% decrease in donations by women (Table 5). Thus, the significant
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e↵ects of these two variables for the whole sample are driven by women. Our companion
paper (Safra, Ma and Melkonyan, 2017) supports this finding by demonstrating that after
controlling for various socioeconomic factors women are more likely to be choice egalitarian
than men.
Table 5. Regression Results by Gender
Specification
Female only Male only
Variable E F
Prevention Rate  0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.009)
 0.035
(0.027)
Ten-Year Survival Rate  0.274⇤⇤⇤
(0.047)
 0.137
(0.104)
Attend 0.144⇤⇤⇤
(0.051)
0.147⇤⇤
(0.065)
Loss 0.735⇤⇤⇤
(0.073)
0.770⇤⇤⇤
(0.097)
Fighting 0.311⇤⇤⇤
(0.095)
0.424⇤⇤⇤
(0.164)
Gift 0.145
(0.141)
0.404
(0.307)
Description: Hereditary 0.136
(0.108)
0.189
(0.132)
Description: Lifestyle-induced  0.480⇤⇤⇤
(0.177)
 0.153
(0.217)
Number of donors 2541 1637
Note. All specifications control both time e↵ects and cancer types. Robust standard errors (White 1980)
are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
As one might have expected, the institutional donors contribute significantly more
than others. According to the estimations reported in Table 4, the institutional donors give
170.5% more. Our analysis of the di↵erences between the institutional and non-institutional
donors is reported in Table 6. Specifications G and H correspond to the models for the sam-
ples of the non-institutional and institutional donors, respectively. Specification I is based
on the whole sample. It includes the interaction terms for the prevention rates with the
institutional dummy. The estimation results reveal that the institutional donors, similar to
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their non-institutional counterparts, are significantly sensitive to the individual responsibil-
ity. For a 1% increase in the prevention rate, the donation amount decreases by 5.6% for
the institutional donors and by 5.2% for the non-institutional donors. Finally, the estimated
e↵ect of the interaction term indicates that the institutional donors are more sensitive to
individual responsibility than non-institutional donors.
Table 6. Regression Results by Institutional
and Non-Institutional Donors
Specification
Non-Institutions Institutions Whole Sample
Variable G H I
Prevention Rate  0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
 0.056⇤⇤
(0.024)
 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
Ten-Year Survival Rate  0.219⇤⇤⇤
(0.039)
0.005
(0.134)
 0.217⇤⇤⇤
(0.038)
Attend 0.150⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
 0.295
(0.422)
0.144⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
Loss 0.742⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
 1.100
(0.690)
0.731⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
Fighting 0.356⇤⇤⇤
(0.077)
1.276
(1.441)
0.351⇤⇤⇤
(0.077)
Gift 0.234⇤
(0.124)
0.240⇤
(0.123)
Gender: Unisex 0.098⇤
(0.051)
0.098⇤
(0.051)
Gender: Male 0.241⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
0.241⇤⇤⇤
(0.037)
Description: Hereditary 0.182⇤⇤
(0.079)
 0.263
(1.171)
0.181⇤⇤
(0.078)
Description: Lifestyle-induced  0.266⇤⇤
(0.130)
 0.919
(0.923)
 0.251⇤
(0.129)
PreventionRate ⇥ Institution  0.010⇤⇤
(0.004)
Number of donors 4799 80 4879
Note. All specifications control both time e↵ects and cancer types. Robust standard errors (White 1980)
are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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5.4 Concluding Remarks
Luck and individual choices play a central role in the distribution of income, health status,
and social standing across individuals within a society. We examine how people view in-
equalities arising from these two factors. An online platform designed by CRUK to solicit
donations to cancer research o↵ers the potential donors an ability to choose the destinations
of their contributions. For some of these destinations, hereditary causes of the disease are
more prevalent while for others lifestyle causes are dominant. Moreover, this information is
explicitly stated for some of the cancer types on the online platform. Thus, through their
contributions donors are revealing how they view the adverse health outcomes that are more
likely to be caused by luck versus those for which individual choices play a relatively large
role. By testing the predictions of our theoretical model, we find that donors contribute
more to hereditary cancers. Based on our estimations, we conclude that a non-negligible
share of the donors embrace choice egalitarianism as a guiding principle in making their
contributions. Interestingly, this e↵ect is mainly due to strong preference for choice egalitar-
ianism among women. Among our other results are the findings that donations decrease with
survival rates and that there is a significant amount of “in-gender favoritism” in donation
behavior.
There are a number of interesting avenues for future research. It would be interesting
to see whether preferences toward fairness principles vary across di↵erent domains. Health-
care policy, unemployment benefits, education system, and income redistribution all seem to
be good candidates for an inclusion in such comparison. Another appealing area for research
would be to compare attitudes to di↵erent fairness principles between the United States and
European countries. As was discussed in Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), a relatively high degree of redistributive taxation and welfare programs in the latter
is at least in part attributable to perceptions in Europe that bad choices are less important
120
than bad luck and more balanced perceptions in the United States. Estimating both these
perceptions and preferences toward fairness principles and then juxtaposing the estimates
from the United States and Europe would o↵er a more complete picture of the di↵erences
in social policies across the two regions. Finally, given the empirical focus of the paper, we
have left a number of interesting extensions of the theoretical model to future research.
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5.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) We start with the analysis of the choice egalitarian ex ante
donor’s choice problem. The first-order condition for her optimization problem is given by
@V xach (d)
@d
=  W1 (y   d, ps (d) + (1  ps (d)) pr) (5.2)
+p0s (d) (1  pr)W2 (y   d, ps (d) + (1  ps (d)) pr)
= 0.
Note that the strict concavity of the functions W and e implies that the second-order con-
dition for the donor’s optimization problem is always satisfied. Denote the optimal level of
d by d⇤. By the implicit function theorem, the e↵ect of pr on the optimal d⇤ is given by
@d⇤
@pr
=  
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d@pr
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d2
=   W12 (·) (1  ps (d
⇤))  p0s (d⇤)W2 (·) + p0s (d⇤) (1  pr) (1  ps (d⇤))W22 (·)
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d2
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from the sign assumptions on the second-order derivatives
of W . Hence, the optimal donation is negatively a↵ected by the prevention rate.
Next consider a choice egalitarian ex post donor. Di↵erentiating V xpch with respect to
d yields the first-order condition for her optimization problem
@V xpch (d)
@d
= p0s (d) [W (y   d, 1) W (y   d, pr)] (5.3)
 ps (d) [W1 (y   d, 1) W1 (y   d, pr)] W1 (y   d, pr)
= 0.
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By the implicit function theorem and the properties of W , we have
@d⇤
@pr
=  
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d@pr
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d2
=   p
0
s (d
⇤)W2 (·)  (1  ps (d⇤))W12 (·)
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d2
< 0,
which implies that the optimal donation of the choice egalitarian ex post donor is also
negatively a↵ected by the prevention rate.
(ii) Since the prevention rate does not appear in either V xanc or V
xp
nc , the optimal donation of
either donor is independent of pr. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2: Since the analysis of the choice egalitarian donor’s problem
subsumes that of the non-choice egalitarian’s (by setting pr = 0), we only deal with the
former. Rewriting the first-order condition (5.2) for the choice egalitarian ex ante donor so
that it explicitly features p0s, we obtain
@V xach (d)
@d
=  W1
 
y   d,  p0s +  1  p0s  e (d)  (1  pr) + pr 
+
 
1  p0s
 
e0 (d) (1  pr)W2
 
y   d,  p0s +  1  p0s  e (d)  (1  pr) + pr 
= 0.
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By the implicit function theorem and the properties of W , we have
@d⇤
@p0s
=  
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d@p0s
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d2
=   W12 (·) (1  e (d
⇤)) (1  pr)  e0 (d⇤) (1  pr)W2 (·)
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d2
 (1  p
0
s) e
0 (d⇤) (1  pr)2 (1  e (d⇤))W22 (·)
@2V xach (d
⇤)
@d2
< 0,
which implies that the optimal donation the choice egalitarian ex ante donor is negatively
a↵ected by the survival rate.
Next, rewriting the first-order condition (5.3) to explicitly include p0s yields
@V xpch (d)
@d
=
 
1  p0s
 
e0 (d) [W (y   d, 1) W (y   d, pr)]
   p0s +  1  p0s  e (d)  [W1 (y   d, 1) W1 (y   d, pr)] W1 (y   d, pr)
= 0.
By the implicit function theorem and the properties of W ,
@d⇤
@p0s
=  
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d@p0s
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d2
=   e
0 (d⇤) [W (y   d⇤, 1) W (y   d⇤, pr)]  (1  e (d⇤)) [W1 (y   d⇤, 1) W1 (y   d⇤, pr)]
@2V xpch (d
⇤)
@d2
,
< 0,
which implies that the optimal donation of the choice egalitarian ex post donor is also
negatively a↵ected by the survival rate. ⌅
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Fairness is a central but controversial concern in social and individual decisions. In practice,
many debates invoking fairness are endless and unresolvable because, even under the same
circumstances, people may perceive fairness in very di↵erent ways (e.g. Konow, 2000). Is
the moral sentiment of fairness something commonly shared by everyone, as Adam Smith
(1759) commented in the eighteenth century? Or is fairness just a vacuous concept that
people use to satisfy their self-serving purposes? To answer these questions, this thesis has
examined fairness views from three di↵erent perspectives.
The first perspective is how theoretical economists model fairness. Chapter 3 revisited
Harsanyi’s utilitarian impartial observer theorem. Departing from Harsanyi’s individual-
centered method, a defence of utilitarianism was provided based on the notion of procedural
fairness. This axiomatic justification of utilitarianism is probably based on the weakest
assumptions made in the literature. The analysis also indicates that a desire for strict pro-
cedural fairness is incompatible with the source indi↵erence axiom in Harsanyi’s framework.
This incompatibility links the current research with various non-utilitarian models in the
literature.
In Chapter 4, an empirical method was adopted to examine what the general public
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perceives as justice in healthcare distribution. This focused on fairness issues around the
rapid rise in lifestyle-related diseases, and whether people who are thought to bring bad
health to themselves deserve equal treatment. Tested through an online survey, in which
subjects were asked to allocate funds to two beneficiaries with di↵erent levels of individual
responsibility, the results reveal that members of the general public take individual respon-
sibility into consideration. They allocate twice as much to alternatives with less individual
responsibility (hereditary cancers) as to competing alternatives with more individual re-
sponsibility (lifestyle-induced cancers). The results also show that ambiguity in individual
responsibility, social-demographics and other perception factors a↵ect allocation decisions.
Lastly, Chapter 5 investigated whether the fairness concern for individual responsi-
bility holds in reality. This was done by analysing real-life donations to CRUK’s newly-
developed platform, where donors can choose between various cancers with di↵erent levels of
individual responsibility. The results indicate that donors do consider individual responsibil-
ity. Their estimated donations increased when hereditary causes of cancers were mentioned,
and decreased when lifestyle-induced causes of cancer were mentioned. A similar result was
also found for disease prevention rates, another proxy of individual responsibility: an increase
in the prevention rate leads to a decrease in estimated donations.
During the exploration of this thesis, we sincerely feel that debates about fairness in
economics are likely to continue, as they have come through all the way in philosophy since
Aristotle’s time. This is because fairness is not only a fundamental element in almost all
social and individual decisions, but also an inherent part of humanity. Ultimately, a topic
like fairness may be impossible to resolve, but it is our hope that this thesis will draw some
attention to and shed light on current fairness studies in economics, leading toward a fairer
and better society.
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